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Abstract 
Due to the existence of free software and pedagogical guides, the use of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) has been further democratized in recent years. Nowadays, it is quite usual for 
practitioners and decision makers with no or little knowledge in operational research to run 
their own efficiency analysis. Within DEA, several alternative models allow for an 
environmental adjustment. Five alternative models, each user-friendly and easily accessible to 
practitioners and decision makers, are performed using empirical data of 90 primary schools 
in the State of Geneva, Switzerland. As the State of Geneva practices an upstream positive 
discrimination policy towards schools, this empirical case is particularly appropriate for an 
environmental adjustment. The majority of alternative DEA models deliver divergent results. 
It is a matter of concern for applied researchers and a matter of confusion for practitioners 
and decision makers. From a political standpoint, these diverging results could potentially 
lead to opposite decisions. As no consensus emerges on the best model to use, practitioners 
and decision makers may be tempted to select the model that is right for them, in other 
words, the model that best reflects their own preferences. Further studies should investigate 
how an appropriate multi-criteria decision analysis method could help decision makers to 
select the right model. 
Grâce à l’existence de logiciels en libre accès et de guides pédagogiques, la méthode Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) s’est démocratisée ces dernières années. Aujourd’hui, il n’est pas 
rare que les décideurs avec peu ou pas de connaissances en recherche opérationnelle réalisent 
eux-mêmes leur propre analyse d’efficience. A l’intérieur de la méthode DEA, plusieurs 
modèles permettent de tenir compte des conditions plus ou moins favorables de 
l’environnement. Cinq de ces modèles, facilement accessibles et applicables par les décideurs, 
sont utilisés pour mesurer l’efficience des 90 écoles primaires du canton de Genève, Suisse. Le 
canton de Genève pratiquant une politique de discrimination positive envers les écoles 
défavorisées, ce cas pratique est particulièrement adapté pour un ajustement à 
l’environnement. La majorité des modèles DEA génèrent des résultats divergents. Ce constat 
est préoccupant pour les chercheurs appliqués et perturbant pour les décideurs. D’un point de 
vue politique, ces résultats divergents peuvent conduire à des prises de décision différentes 
selon le modèle sur lequel elles sont fondées. Dans la mesure où aucun consensus n’émerge 
sur le meilleur modèle à utiliser, les décideurs peuvent être tentés de choisir le modèle qui 
reflète au mieux leurs préférences. L’application d’une méthode d’aide à la décision multi-
critères, pour aider les décideurs à choisir le « bon » modèle, devrait êtes investiguée dans de 
futures recherches. 
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1. Context 
The use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is experiencing rapid and continuous growth. In 2002, 
Tavares (2002) identified 3203 DEA publications (journal articles, research articles, event articles, 
books and dissertations). In 2008, Emrouznejad, Parker and Tavares (2008) inventoried more than 
7000 publications. This growth reflects the need for user-friendly performance measurement 
methods. In recent years, the use of DEA has been further democratized due to (1) the existence of 
free software, such as Win4DEAP, Efficiency Measurement System or DEA Solver, (2) the 
publication of pedagogical guides (Coelli, 1996; Coelli, Prasada Rao, O’Donnell & Battese, 2005, 
pp. 161-206; Huguenin, 2012; Huguenin, 2013a; Huguenin, 2013b) and (3) the teaching of DEA in 
under- and postgraduate programs1. The Google Scholar search engine returned 51 400 documents 
after a search on ‘data’, ‘envelopment’ and ‘analysis’ on 15 March 2013. Nowadays, it is quite usual 
for practitioners and decision makers with little or no background in operational research and 
economics to run their own efficiency analysis2. For instance, a web-based platform integrating DEA 
has been developed in Portugal for secondary schools’ headteachers (Portela, Camanho & Borges, 
2001). Users are able to perform their own efficiency analysis by selecting the schools to be included 
in the dataset and the variables to be included in the analysis3. 
The external environment could influence the ability of management to convert inputs into outputs 
and, as a result, impact entities’ technical efficiency. Following Coelli et al. (2005, p. 190), an 
environmental variable is defined as a factor that could influence the efficiency of an entity, where 
such a factor is not a traditional input and is assumed to be outside of the manager’s control. Because 
it is not under the control of managers, such a factor is also called a non-discretionary variable4. It 
cannot be varied at the discretion of an individual manager but nevertheless needs to be taken into 
account to measure efficiency (Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2007, p. 215). This paper considers 
traditional inputs as those covered by the OECD KLEMS model, which considers five categories of 
inputs: capital (K) labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) and services (S) (OECD, 2001). 
Examples of environmental variables include ownership differences (such as public versus private), 
location characteristics, labour relations (such as conflictual versus peaceful relationships between 
trade unions and employers’ organizations) and government regulations (Fried, Schmidt & 
Yaisawarng, 1999). Location characteristics consist of the environmental variables which are specific 
to the location of an entity, such as a supermarket influenced by population density. 
In the education sector, three main generic drivers can be considered as environmental variables. They 
influence pupil performance but are outside of the control of headteachers (Soteriou, Karahanna, 
Papanastasiou & Diakourakis, 1998, p. 68, based on Thanassoulis, 1996, p. 883). They consist of (1) 
pupil characteristics, such as intelligence, willingness or effort propensity, (2) family and the external 
                                                 
1  For instance, DEA is taught at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, in three different courses: (1) Public 
Sector Performance Measurement (Master of Science in Public Policy and Management), (2) Public Sector 
Financial Management (Master of Advanced Studies in Public Administration) and (3) Benchmarking (Certificate 
of Advanced Studies in Administration and Management of Educational Establishments). About 90 decision 
makers in the public sector are trained annually in the use of DEA.  
2  The author of this study regularly meets Swiss headteachers who use DEA to assess individual teachers, classes 
or schools. 
3  Note that this plateform represents an example of “ascending” benchmarking (Viger, 2007), where the starting 
point of the analysis comes from the base (i.e. the headteachers). 
4  Non-controllable variables and exogenous variables are used as synonyms to non-discretionary variables in the 
DEA literature. 
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environment, such as the socioeconomic status of pupils and (3) school related factors (which are 
outside of the control of headteachers). In this latter category, school size (as measured by the number 
of pupils) is, for instance, outside of the control of headteachers in Switzerland, as they have to 
register every single pupil residing in the catchment area defined by school authorities. 
Environmental variables in school efficiency measurement using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
include (non exhaustive list): 
- school location in a particular region (Agasisti, 2013; Burney, Johnes, Al-Enezi & Al-Musallam, 
2013); 
- types of school, such as private schools (Agasisti, 2013; Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998; Lovell, 
Walters and Wood, 1994; Ramanathan, 2001), all-girls schools (Alexander & Jaforullah, 2004; 
Alexander, Haug & Jaforullah, 2010; Bradley, Johnes & Millington, 2001), urban and rural 
schools (Agasisti, 2013; Alexander & Jaforullah, 2004; Alexander, Haug & Jaforullah, 2010; 
Denaux, Lipscomb & Plumly, 2011; Kantabutra & Tang, 2006; Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 
1998); 
- socioeconomic status of pupils (Alexander & Jaforullah, 2004; Alexander, Haug & Jaforullah, 
2010; Borge & Naper, 2006; Bradley, Johnes & Little, 2010; Denaux et al., 2011; McCarty & 
Yaisawarng, 1993; Ouellette & Vierstraete, 2005; Rassouli-Currier, 2007); 
- school size (Agasisti, 2013; Borge & Naper, 2006; Bradley et al., 2001; Duncombe, Miner & 
Ruggiero, 1997; Kantabutra & Tang, 2006; Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998); 
- political factors (Borge & Naper, 2006; Waldo, 2007); 
- teacher characteristics (Alexander & Jaforullah, 2004; Alexander, Haug & Jaforullah, 2010; 
Bradley, et al., 2001; Burney, Johnes, Al-Enezi & Al-Musallam, 2013; Diagne, 2006; Duncombe, 
Miner & Ruggiero, 1997; Lovell, Walters & Wood, 1994; Ruggiero & Vitaliano, 1999). 
Positive discrimination policies are implemented by public authorities to adjust for the environment5. 
They aim to compensate the negative impact of environmental variables (mainly socioeconomic status 
of pupils) on school performance. In Europe, these priority education policies are defined as 
policies designed to have an effect on educational disadvantaged 
through systems or programs of focused action (whether the focus be 
determined according to socioeconomic, ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
geographic, or educational criteria) by offering something more 
(‘better’ or ‘different’) to designated populations (Frandji, 2008, 
p. 12). 
Within DEA, several models allow for an environmental adjustment. Following Muñiz (2002), they 
can be grouped in three categories: (1) one-stage models (Banker & Morey, 1986a; Banker & Morey, 
1986b; Ruggiero, 19966; Yang and Paradi in Muñiz, Ruggiero, Paradi and Yang, 2006), (2) multi-
stage models including two-stage (Ray, 1988; Ray, 1991), three-stage (Ruggiero, 1998; Fried, Lovell, 
Schmidt & Yaisawarng, 2002; Muñiz, 2002) and four-stage models (Fried, Schmidt & Yaisawarng, 
                                                 
5  Some of these policies are essentially built on an ideological basis (Demeuse & Friant, 2012).  
6  Ruggiero (1996) develops an additional one-stage model. However, this model seems to be rather an extension of 
the Banker and Morey (1986a) model that allows for categorical variables. As it allows continous environmental 
variables, it is comparable to the Banker and Morey (1986b) model (Ruggiero, 1996, p. 555). 
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1999) and (3) program analysis models (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1981)7. There are few published 
studies which compare these models with one another. 
The empirical field of this study considers the case of public primary schools in the State of Geneva, 
Switzerland. As the State of Geneva has implemented upstream positive discrimination measures since 
2008, this empirical case is particularly appropriate for an environmental adjustment. The Geneva 
public school system is described in the next section. 
 
2. Geneva public school system 
In the State of Geneva, education is compulsory at early childhood (corresponding to the 
international standard classification of education ISCED # 0) for a duration of 2 years, primary 
(ISCED # 1) for a duration of 6 years and lower secondary education (ISCED # 2) for a duration of 3 
years. 
In 2010-2011, the State of Geneva registered 90 public primary schools. These schools are funded by 
the State government (chiefly for staff salary) and by local authorities – municipalities (chiefly for 
school infrastructure). Pupil competences are assessed with the use of standardized tests at three 
different times in two or three subjects. At the end of the second grade, French (mother tongue) and 
mathematics are assessed; at the end of the fourth and sixth grade, French, German (first foreign 
language) and mathematics are assessed. 
Primary schools are managed by headteachers assisted by one or several teachers working part time as 
headteachers’ assistants. Staff consists of teachers, secretaries and schoolkeepers (maintenance). In 
some schools, educators are also active. 
In order to adjust to local environment, partial autonomy in management is granted to schools. For 
instance, headteachers define job profiles and recruit teachers; they are responsible for school quality 
(and hence pupil performance); and they also chair the school board. 
Every school has a board composed by representatives of the school staff, parents and city civil-
servants and is chaired by the headteacher. The board demonstrates instances of democracy where 
stakeholders are informed and consulted. Whilst they only have limited authority about school 
management, they can make propositions about day-to-day school life. School boards aim to develop 
better relationships between school, families and local communities. 
The main characteristics of primary schools are as follows: 
- A school can be located on one or several sites (up to five); which implies that school buildings 
can be spread over several locations (or sites); 
- Special education is only available in a limited number of schools (21 schools out of 90); which 
means that pupils with special needs are grouped in the schools where special education is 
available; 
- Special reception classes for immigrant pupils are only available in a limited number of schools 
(35 schools out of 90). 
                                                 
7  Note that Yang and Pollitt (2009) propose the following categories: separative models (in which Charnes, Cooper 
& Rhodes (1981) and Banker & Morey (1986a) would be classified), one-stage models, two-stage models, three-
stage models and four-stage models. 
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The State of Geneva practices a policy of positive discrimination towards schools. Additional teaching 
resources are allocated to disadvantaged schools. Five school categories (A to E) are defined according 
to the percentage of pupils (per school) whose parents are blue-collar workers or unqualified workers 
– category # 9 of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (Observatory on Primary 
Education, 2010). This variable, SOCIO, reflects the socioeconomic status of pupils. For instance, 
schools with a SOCIO proportion of more than 50% are considered as the most disadvantaged 
schools and are classified in the E category. Table 1 describes the quantity of additional teaching staff 
per pupil that schools receive. 
 
Table 1 
Positive discrimination in Geneva: more teaching staff for disadvantaged schools 
Category
(# of schools)
Pupils in the lowest
socioeconomic category (%)
Pupil/teacher
target ratio
Teacher/pupil
target ratio
Additional teaching staff
per pupil (%)
A (15) 0.00-19.99 18.55 0.0539 0.00
B (20) 20.00-29.99 18.15 0.0551 2.20
C (20) 30.00-39.99 17.45 0.0573 6.30
D (15) 40.00-49.99 16.65 0.0601 11.41
E (20) 50.00-100.00 15.25 0.0656 21.64  
Source: General Direction of Primary Schools, Education Department, State of Geneva. 
 
A school in category A has a target teacher/pupil ratio of 0.054 (i.e. 18.55 pupils per teacher). This 
target is defined by the State authority. Such a school does not receive any additional resources as it is 
in the most advantaged category. A school in category B has a target teacher/pupil ratio of 0.0551 (i.e. 
18.15 pupils per teacher). It receives 2.2% additional teaching staff (i.e. 0.0539 + (0.022 x 0.0539)). 
A school in category C has a target teacher/pupil ratio of 0.0573 (i.e. 17.45 pupils per teacher). It 
receives 6.3% additional teaching staff (i.e. 0.0539 + (0.063 x 0.0539)). A school in category D has a 
target teacher/pupil ratio of 0.0601 (i.e. 16.65 pupils per teacher). It receives 11.41% additional 
teaching staff (i.e. 0.0539 + (0.1141 x 0.0539)). Finally, a school in category E has a target 
teacher/pupil ratio of 0.0656 (i.e. 15.25 pupils per teacher). It receives 21.64% additional teaching 
staff (i.e. 0.0539 + (0.2164 x 0.0539))8. 
 
                                                 
8  As the detrimental condition of the environment is compensated by additional resources, the relevance to 
actually use a model which allows for an environmental adjustment is open to debate. Consider two schools with 
one pupil each. Both of them obtain a test’s results of 6. The first school faces a detrimental environment and 
receives 20% additional teaching staff. Instead of having one teacher, it thus has 1.2 teachers. The second school 
faces a favourable environment. It does not receive additional resources, and stays with one teacher. With a 
classical DEA model, with no environmental adjustment, the first school obtains an efficiency score of 83.3% 
and the second one a score of 100%. The first school is penalized for having received additional resources. In 
order to be 100% efficient, its pupils should obtain a test’s result 20% higher than the pupil attending the second 
school. However, one cannot expect from the disadvantaged pupil to become 20% better than the advantaged 
pupil. One can probably only expect that the disadvantaged pupil becomes as good as the advantaged pupil. 
Another point to take into consideration is that the test’s results are bounded to a maximum number of points. 
Consider that 6 is the best grade possible. If both pupils obtain a 6, the first school will always be less efficient, 
because it is not possible for its pupil to score higher than 6. As a result, it seems appropriate to use a model 
which allows for an environmental adjustment. With such a model, both schools obtain an efficiency score of 
100% in the above mentioned example.  
  
5 
3. Objectives 
The aim of this study is to test how several alternative DEA models, each of which measure efficiency, 
can deliver diverging results. Unlike studies using simulated data, this study intentionally uses 
empirical data. As a result, the comparison is made between the estimates of the alternative models, 
without knowing whether these estimates approximate the ‘true’ efficiency measure (which could be 
estimated with a simulation analysis)9. By using empirical data, this study addresses the issue faced by 
practitioners and decision makers who perform their own efficiency analysis. It seeks to determine 
whether the alternative models produce convergent results (consistent efficiency scores and rankings 
of entities). If the alternative models do produce convergent results, practitioners and decision makers 
may confidently select any model. If they produce divergent results, the choice of model becomes a 
strategic issue. 
The alternative models tested in this study are all user-friendly and easily accessible to practitioners 
and decision makers. The empirical case is the 90 primary schools of the State of Geneva, 
Switzerland. It is particularly well suited to test several alternative models, as (1) the State of Geneva 
practices positive discrimination towards disadvantaged schools and (2) schools are grouped in five 
categories defined by one continuous variable (percentage of pupils whose parents are blue-collar 
workers or unqualified workers). According to their respective category, schools receive additional 
teaching staff. 
 
4. Adjusting for the environment in DEA 
Within DEA, several models allow for an environmental adjustment. Following Muñiz (2002), they 
can be grouped into three categories: (1) one-stage models (Banker & Morey, 1986a; Banker & 
Morey, 1986b; Ruggiero, 199610; Yang & Paradi model in Muñiz, Ruggiero, Paradi & Yang, 2006, 
p. 1176), (2) multi-stage models including two-stage (Ray, 1991), three-stage (Ruggiero, 1998; Fried, 
Lovell, Schmidt & Yaisawarng, 2002; Muñiz, 2002) and four-stage models (Fried, Schmidt & 
Yaisawarng, 1999) and (3) program analysis models (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1981). 
The models which allow for an environmental adjustment are shortly introduced hereafter, alongside 
their main advantages and drawbacks (Thanassoulis, Portela & Despic, 2008). The basic variable 
returns to scale DEA model (VRS) is first recalled (Banker, Charnes & Cooper, 1984). This basic 
model does not allow for an environmental adjustment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  Another research question, not treated in this study, would be to determine whether the estimates of alternative 
models converge or diverge with the ‘true’ efficiency. This question cannot be answered by using empirical data, 
as the ‘true’ efficiency is unknown. The only way to calculate the ‘true’ efficiency would consist of (1) defining a 
production function, (2) generating inputs from a random distribution and (3) deriving outputs. Note that 
existing studies using simulated data provide mixed results about the convergence of alternative models with the 
‘true’ efficiency (see Section 5 about it). 
10  Ruggiero (1996) develops an additional one-stage model. However, this model seems to be an extension of the 
Banker and Morey (1986a) model that allows for categorical variables. As it allows continous environmental 
variables, it is comparable to the Banker and Morey (1986b) model (Ruggiero, 1996, p. 555). 
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Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) – No environmental adjustment 
The basic VRS model measures entities’ technical efficiency under the assumption of variable returns 
to scale. 
Following the notation adopted by Johnes (2004, pp. 630-637), there are data on s  outputs and m  
inputs for each of n  primary schools to be evaluated ( n  = 90 in the current study). rky  is the 
quantity of output r  produced by school k . ikx  is the quantity of input i  consumed by school k . 
kθ  represents the VRS efficiency of school k  (i.e. ‘pure’ technical efficiency free from any scale 
inefficiency). jλ  represents the associated weighting of outputs and inputs of entity j . 
The VRS efficiency of the kth school is calculated by solving the following linear problem: 
 
Minimize kθ  (1) 
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=
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n
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Banker and Morey (1986a) – One-stage model 
The Banker and Morey (1986a) model, also called the categorical model, can be applied when: 
- DMUs are grouped into different categories according to the condition of the environment; 
- And the environmental variable can be ordered from the least to the most detrimental upon 
efficiency. 
For instance, the 90 primary schools in the State of Geneva are divided into five hierarchical 
categories (A to E). Schools in category A face the most advantageous environment. Schools in 
category E face the most detrimental environment. If the measurement of efficiency did not take into 
account the fact that schools face different environments (i.e. it considered each school to be in the 
same category), the evaluation would be unfair on the schools facing a difficult environment and too 
indulgent on the schools facing an advantageous environment. 
In the Banker and Morey (1986a) model, ‘E’ schools are classified as category 1, ‘D’ schools as 
category 2, ‘C’ schools as category 3, ‘B’ schools as category 4 and ‘A’ schools as category 5. School 
efficiency is then evaluated in the following way, using the basic VRS (or constant returns to scale) 
model: 
- Schools in category 1 are only evaluated against schools within this group; 
- Schools in category 2 are evaluated with reference to schools in category 1 and 2; 
- Schools in category 3 are evaluated with reference to schools in category 1, 2 and 3; 
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- Schools in category 4 are evaluated with reference to schools in category 1, 2, 3 and 4; 
- Finally, schools in category 5 are evaluated with reference to schools in category 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
5. 
The Banker and Morey (1986a) model evaluates schools under operating handicaps which take into 
account their particular environments. This ensures that no school is compared to another with a 
more favourable environment. The VRS formulation of the categorical model is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
Garrett and Kwak (2011) apply the Banker and Morey (1986a) model in the case of 447 school 
districts in the State of Missouri, USA. They use relative district wealth as the categorical variable with 
three categorical levels (rich, average and poor). 
The main advantage of the Banker and Morey (1986a) model is that it is appropriate for dealing with 
non-discretionary variables that are qualitative or categorical. Moreover, it is easy to calculate. The 
method is simple and therefore transparent. There are at least two disadvantages to this approach. 
First, the various categories have to be ordered hierarchically (from the least to the most favourable). 
This ordering is not always natural. Second, the Banker and Morey (1986a) model reduces the 
discriminating power of DEA which depends on the number of entities relative to the number of 
variables included in the model. As the Banker and Morey (1986a) model considers various sub-
samples according to the number of categories, the smaller the sub-sample, the lower the 
discriminating power between entities that is achieved by DEA (all other things being equal). 
 
Banker and Morey (1986b) – One-stage model 
The Banker and Morey (1986b) model directly includes environmental variable(s) as continuous non-
discretionary input or output variables in the linear programming formulation. This model takes into 
account the fact that environmental variables are outside of the control of management and cannot be 
treated as discretionary factors. As a result, the constraints on the environmental variable are 
modified. Assuming an input-orientation with variable returns to scale, the inputs are divided into 
discretionary (xD) and non-discretionary (xND) sets. The VRS formulation of the categorical model is 
presented in Appendix 1. 
The environmental variable has to be included as a non-discretionary input or output variable. This 
implies it is first necessary to decide upon the direction of influence of the environmental variable. 
Following Coelli et al. (2005): 
If the variable is believed to have a positive effect upon efficiency then 
it should be included in the linear program in the same way as a non-
discretionary input would be included. (…). On the other hand, if 
instead we have a set of ‘negative-effect’ environmental variables to 
add to the model then they should be included in the linear program 
in the same way as a non-discretionary output would be included 
(p. 192). 
Muñiz (2002) strictly applies the Banker and Morey (1986b) model in the context of the education 
sector. He tests several models considering different non-discretionary variables: percentage of 
students who usually study more than 10 hours a week; percentage of students who believe that both 
their parents and teachers have high prospects with regard to their academic future; percentage of 
students whose annual family income exceeds two and a half million pesetas; percentage of students 
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who did not change teaching centres in that academic year or in the previous; percentage of students 
who are only children. 
Several studies include non-discretionary variables as inputs or outputs but perform a standard DEA 
model (i.e. a constant returns to scale or a variable returns to scale model) instead of a Banker and 
Morey (1986b) model. This leads to biased (if not invalid) results. Examples are found in Garrett and 
Kwak (2011) or in Diagne (2006).  
The main advantage of the Banker and Morey (1986b) model is that it is able to accommodate 
multiple and continuous non-discretionary variables. However, this approach presents various 
disadvantages: 
- Ruggiero (1996) shows that Banker and Morey’s (1986b) model formulation leads to referent 
points that are not feasible. See Ruggiero (2004, pp. 330-331) for a numerical example. 
- The Banker and Morey (1986b) model requires a prior understanding and specification of the 
direction of influence of the non-discretionary variables. 
Assuming that the direction of influence of the non-discretionary variables is understood, the Banker 
and Morey (1986b) model is easy to calculate. The method is simple and therefore transparent. 
 
Ruggiero (1996) – One-stage model 
The Banker and Morey (1986b) model defines efficiency with respect to discretionary variables only. 
Ruggiero (1996) shows that it leads to referent points that are not feasible. He provides a one-stage 
model to correct this problem by excluding all entities with a more favorable environment from the 
evaluation of each entity. The Ruggiero (1996) model is quite similar to the Banker and Morey 
(1986a) model, with the difference that it allows for continuous environmental variables11. 
As the Ruggiero (1996) model is not applied in this study, its formulation is not presented. See 
Ruggiero (1996, pp.559-560) for the model specification.  
Ruggiero (1996) provides an application of the model to the case of school districts in the State of 
New York. He uses the percentage of adults with college education as an environmental input. 
The main advantages of the Ruggiero (1996) model are that (1) it is able to accommodate multiple 
and continuous non-discretionary variables and that (2) it does not lead to non-feasible referent 
points. However, this approach suffers from various drawbacks: 
- Similar to the Banker and Morey (1986b) model, the Ruggiero (1996) model requires a prior 
understanding and specification of the direction of influence of the non-discretionary variables. 
- The Ruggiero (1996) model is not able to consistently handle many non-discretionary variables. 
As Ruggiero (2004, p. 332) points out 
A potentially more serious problem is the inability to handle many 
non-discretionary factors. As the number of non-discretionary inputs 
increases, the probability of overestimating efficiency increases. As a 
result, inefficient DMUs could be identified as efficient by default. 
This model does not recognize tradeoffs that exist between the non-
discretionary variables; a given DMU under analysis could have a 
                                                 
11  The Ruggiero (1996) model is an extension of the Banker and Morey (1986a) model that allows for categorical 
variables. As it allows continous environmental variables, it is comparable to the Banker and Morey (1986b) 
model (Ruggiero, 1996, p. 555). 
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favourable environment because it has favourable levels of most non-
discretionary factors but have a limited referent set only because it has 
an unfavourable level of at least one non-discretionary input (p. 332). 
As the Ruggiero (1996) model is not included in a DEA software package, it is not easy to calculate, 
although the method appears simple and therefore transparent. 
 
Yang and Paradi in Muñiz, Ruggiero, Paradi and Yang (2006, p. 1176) – One-stage 
model 
The Yang and Paradi model applies a handicapping measure based on the levels of the non-
discretionary variables. Entities with a favourable environment are penalized by the handicapping 
measure. In such a case, inputs are adjusted with a higher handicap (i.e. they are augmented) and/or 
outputs are adjusted with a lower handicap (i.e. they are reduced). As a result, adjusted inputs have a 
higher value than original inputs and adjusted outputs have a lower value than original outputs. The 
VRS formulation of the Yang and Paradi model is presented in Appendix 1.  
Muñiz et al. (2006) provide an application of the Yang and Paradi model using simulated data. The 
decision to adjust data before running a DEA model is supported by Barnum and Gleason (2008). 
The main advantage of the Yang and Paradi model is that it does not lessen the discriminating power 
of DEA, as it does not categorize the entities. The use of handicapping measures presents two 
disadvantages. First, the direction of influence has to be understood prior to the variables’ adjustment. 
Second, the values of the handicapping measures have to be defined. In most cases, the extent to 
which the variables have to be augmented or lowered is unclear. In the context of this study, it makes 
sense to apply the Yang and Paradi model as the handicapping values are known. 
Assuming that the handicapping measures jh and jhˆ  have been defined, the Yang and Paradi model 
is moderately easy to calculate12. The method is simple and therefore transparent. 
 
Ray (1991) – Two-stage model 
The two-stage model is first introduced by Ray (1988) and further developed by Ray (1991). In the 
first stage, a basic DEA model (1) is performed using only discretionary variables. After obtaining the 
technical efficiency scores (TE) from the first stage, Ray (1991) uses an OLS model to regress these 
scores upon non-discretionary variables in the second stage. The second stage regression is specified as 
follows: 
 
TEk = α0 + β1X1 + …βvXv + ek (2) 
 
                                                 
12  Priority education policies or "PEPs" (also known as positive discrimination policies) aim to compensate for the 
negative impact of environmental variables (mainly socioeconomic status of pupils) on school performance. Such 
policies have been introduced in the US, England, Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania 
or Sweden (Demeuse, Frandji, Greger & Rochex, 2012). Additional funding allocated to disadvantaged schools is 
an example of PEPs focused on the institutions. When the additional funding is known, the value of the 
handicapping measure of the Yang and Paradi model can easily be calculated. This is the case in the context of 
this study. 
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The error term represents the efficiency. Since Ray (1991), other types of regression have been used in 
the second stage. For instance, McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) are the first to use a Tobit regression. 
Applications of the two-stage models in the education sector include Agasisti (2013), Borge and 
Naper (2006), Burney, Johnes, Al-Enezy and Al-Musallam (2013), Denaux et al. (2011), Rassouli-
Currier (2007) or Waldo (2007). 
According to Coelli (2005, pp. 194-195), the two-stage model presents the advantages of being able 
to accommodate (1) more than one variable and (2) both categorical and continuous variables. 
Moreover, it does not require a prior understanding of the direction of influence of the non-
discretionary variables. It is also easy to calculate. The method is simple and therefore transparent. As 
the second stage introduces a regression analysis, the Ray (1991) model presents the disadvantages 
inherent to such techniques. Mainly, it requires the specification of a functional form to the 
regression model. Any misspecification may distort the results. Cordero et al. (2009) also point out 
that the adjustment of efficiency scores takes into account (only) the radial component of inefficiency 
and not the potential inefficiency derived from slacks13. 
 
Ruggiero (1998) – Three-stage model 
The first two stages of the Ruggiero (1998) model are identical to those used in Ray (1991). In the 
third stage, the parameters estimated from the second stage regression are used to construct an index 
for the non-discretionary variables. The following index NDx  is considered: ∑
=
=
v
u
ND
uu
ND xx
1
β , where 
v  is the number of non-discretionary variables. The DEA model is run again in the third stage by 
using the index for the non-discretionary variables to exclude all entities with a more favourable 
environment from the evaluation of each entity14. 
As the Ruggiero (1998) model is not applied in this study; its formulation is not presented. See 
Ruggiero (2004, pp. 333-334) for the model specification.  
Ruggiero (1998; 2004) provides an application of his three-stage model using simulated data. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the Ray (1991) model apply to stage one and two of the 
Ruggiero (1998) model. An additional disadvantage arises in the third stage, as the efficient entities 
(on the frontier) are the same as those which would be computed by using a DEA model in which all 
variables were discretionary. This is the case because the efficiency frontier is the same in both 
situations. As a result, only the scores of the inefficient entities are modified by the Ruggiero (1998) 
model. This approach is difficult to calculate. It is sophisticated and therefore not transparent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  Efficiency scores generated by DEA are similar with or without the calculation of slacks. In the two-stage 
method, the coefficients of the regression are calculated towards the efficiency scores as a dependent variable. 
Their values will be identical whether these scores belong to entities whose inefficiency is composed by only a 
radial factor or a radial and a slack factor. 
14  The specification of the Ruggiero (1998) three-stage model is therefore similar to the specification of the 
Ruggiero (1996) one-stage model. It only replaces the original values of the environmental variables in the one-
stage model by the index of environmental variables in the third-stage model. 
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Muñiz (2002) – Three-stage model 
The first stage of the Muñiz (2002) model uses model # 1 (with only discretionary variables) to 
compute technical efficiency scores. Muñiz’s (2002) following approach focuses on the slacks, which 
are added in model # 3 hereafter. Considering output slacks, rs , and input slacks, is , the model can 
be described: 
 
Minimize ∑ ∑
= =
−−
s
r
m
i
irk ss
1 1
εεθ  (3) 
Subject to ∑
=
=+−
n
j
rrjjrk syy
1
0λ     sr ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
=−−
n
j
iijjikk sxx
1
0λθ    mi ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
=
n
j
j
1
1λ  
 0,, ≥irj ssλ  misrnj ,...,1;,...,1;,...,1 ===∀  
 
Here, ε  is a non-Archimedean value defined to be smaller than any positive number, but greater than 
0. 
In the Muñiz (2002) model, the total slack values in each variable, defined as the sum of the radial 
and the non-radial movements, are used15. By taking into account the total slack, the model avoids 
losing information from the non-radial movement.  
The slacks computed by model # 3 are confounded by the influence of the non-discretionary variables 
(i.e. the non-discretionary inputs in the input-oriented model), since they have not been included in 
the first stage. 
The objective of the second stage is to distinguish between the slacks associated with (1) the real 
technical inefficiency of the entity and (2) the non-discretionary variables. A separate DEA analysis is 
performed for the slacks of each (discretionary) variable. The model must therefore be run once for 
each discretionary variable. The slack detected for every entity in a specific variable is used as a 
variable itself (to be minimized) in the respective DEA models. The objective of this second stage is to 
minimize the slacks in a discretionary variable subject to the non-discretionary variables. In other 
words, the second stage determines the minimum amount of slacks achievable by an entity for a 
specific variable subject to the value of the non-discretionary variables. 
To perform the third stage, original data of each entity are adjusted by removing the slack values 
associated with the non-discretionary variables. The third stage consists of a DEA model which uses 
the adjusted data values of the discretionary variables. The technical efficiency scores are not 
                                                 
15  By contrast, the Ruggiero (1998) model only takes the radial movement into account in the second stage. 
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confounded by the influence of non-discretionary variables anymore, as the slacks calculated in the 
third stage are due exclusively to the inefficient performance of the entity.  
As the Muñiz (2002) model is not applied in this study; its formulation is not presented. See Muñiz 
(2002, pp. 628-631) for the model specification. 
Muñiz (2002) applies his model to 62 high schools in the State of Asturias, Spain. In the second 
stage, he uses the following variables as non-discretionary inputs: percentage of students who usually 
study more than 10 hours a week; percentage of students who believe that both their parents and 
teachers have high prospects with regard to their academic future; percentage of students whose 
annual family income exceeds two and a half million pesetas; percentage of students who did not 
change teaching centres in that academic year or in the previous; percentage of students who are only 
children. 
The main advantage of the Muñiz (2002) model is the use of non-parametric techniques in every 
stage16. As a result, no functional form has to be specified. This is useful when the productive process 
of entities under analysis is unknown. The Muñiz (2002) model also captures information included in 
the slacks. High cost of time and calculation are the main disadvantages of this approach, which is 
sophisticated and therefore not transparent. 
 
Fried, Lovell, Schmidt and Yaisawarng (2002) – Three-stage model 
The first stage of the Fried et al. (2002) model uses model # 3 (with only discretionary variables) to 
compute technical efficiency scores. The slacks are broadly interpreted as being composed of three 
effects: the influence of the environment (first effect), inefficiencies due to management (second 
effect) and statistical noise arising from measurement errors (third effect). The second stage aims to 
decompose the slacks into these three effects using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 
In the second stage, the dependent variables are the total input slacks (radial and non-radial 
movements). They are regressed against the non-discretionary variables (first effect). SFA separates 
residual into two parts: managerial inefficiencies (second effect) and statistical noise (third effect).  
In the third stage, discretionary variables data are adjusted in a manner that accounts for the influence 
of the environment and statistical noise. The first stage is then repeated using the adjusted data, 
providing technical efficiency scores devoid of environmental effects and statistical noise. 
As the Fried et al. (2002) model is not applied in this study; its formulation is not presented. See 
Fried et al. (2002, pp. 160-164) for the model specification. 
As far as the author is aware, the Fried et al. (2002) model has not been applied to the education 
sector. Applications of this model are found in Yanyan (2012) with respect to commercial banks; 
Shang, Hung, Lo and Wang (2008) with respect to hotels or Lee (2008) with respect to paper 
companies.  
The Fried et al. (2002) model presents the advantages of being able to accommodate the following 
into the second stage: (1) more than one variable and (2) both categorical and continuous variables. 
Moreover, it does not require a prior understanding of the direction of influence of the non-
discretionary variables and it captures the information included in the slacks. As the second stage 
introduces a SFA, the Fried et al. (2002) model presents the disadvantages inherent to such technique. 
                                                 
16  The use of non-parametric techniques in every stage has also a drawback, as it is sensitive to outliers. 
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As the residual is separated into an error component and an inefficiency component in SFA, it 
requires specification of the distributional form of the efficiency component. Any misspecification 
may distort the results. The Fried et al. (2002) model is difficult to calculate and time-consuming. 
The method is sophisticated and therefore not transparent. 
 
Fried, Schmidt and Yaisawarng (1999) – Four-stage model 
The first stage uses model # 3 (with only discretionary variables) to compute technical efficiency 
scores. In the second stage, the total slacks are regressed upon the environmental variables.In the third 
stage, the parameters estimated from the second stage regression are used to predict the total input 
slacks (if the model is input-oriented) or the total output surplus (if the model is output-oriented). 
These predicted values are used to calculate adjusted values of the original inputs or outputs. In the 
fourth stage, the DEA model is run again using the adjusted data. It provides technical inefficiency 
scores devoid of environmental influence.  
As the Fried et al. (1999) model is not applied in this study; its formulation is not presented. See 
Fried et al. (1999, pp. 252-255) for the model specification. 
Sav (2013) and Cordero-Ferrara, Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jiménez (2008) provide the only two 
existing applications of the Fried et al. (1999) model in the education sector. Sav (2013) measures 
technical efficiency of 227 universities. Three environmental variables are used in the second stage: 
the state and local government contribution to public university operating expenses per full-time 
equivalent student; the number of high school students per 1000 that score at the 80th percentile and 
above on either the SAT or ACT tests; the number of college freshmen imported from other states 
relative to the number of resident freshman attending college out-of-state. Cordero-Ferrara et al. 
(2008) measure the efficiency of 80 high-schools in the State of Extramaduria, Spain. They use three 
non-discretionary components in the second stage. These components are derived from eleven non-
discretionary variables using Principal Component Analysis.  
The Fried et al. (1999) four-stage model presents the advantages of being able to accommodate in the 
second stage (1) more than one variable and (2) both categorical and continuous variables. Moreover, 
it does not require a prior understanding of the direction of influence of the non-discretionary 
variables. It captures the information included in the slacks. As the second stage introduces a 
regression analysis, the Fried et al. (1999) model presents the disadvantages inherent to such 
techniques. Mainly, it requires the specification of a functional form to the regression model. 
Moreover, a significant relationship between the slacks and the environmental variable has to be 
identified in order to apply this approach. The Fried et al. (1999) model is moderately complicated to 
calculate. The method is sophisticated and therefore not transparent. 
 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981) – Program analysis model 
The program analysis model developed by Charnes et al. (1981) is an alternative approach to the 
previous ones. Its objective is not to adjust the efficiency scores to the environment but to reveal 
potential efficiency differences between several ‘programs’. The Charnes et al. (1981) model consists 
of three steps. 
In the first step, the entire sample is divided into sub-samples of entities facing the same environment 
(or operating the same ‘program’). DEA models are solved for each sub-sample separately. In the 
second step, all observed data points are projected onto their respective frontiers to ‘artificially’ 
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eliminate inefficiency attributed to management. Finally, a single DEA model is run using the data 
projected values. Note that remaining technical inefficiency can be attributed, in this model, to 
environmental variables17.  
The first application of the program analysis model in the education sector was produced by Charnes 
et al. (1981). Schools running under the ‘Program Follow Through’ are compared to schools not 
running under this program18. Other applications include Portela and Thanassoulis (2001), Soteriou, 
Karahanna, Papanastasiou and Diakourakis (1998) or Diamond and Medewitz (1990). Portela and 
Thanassoulis (2001) use the program analysis model to assess pupils within schools of the same type 
and within schools of all types. Soteriou et al. (1998) assess the efficiency of secondary schools in 
Cyprus. They separate schools into two groups operating in an urban or a rural environment. 
Diamond and Medewitz (1990) assess the efficiency of high-school classes. They consider two 
categories of classes: in the first one, the Developmental Economic Education Program is applied; in 
the second one, it is not. 
The main advantage of the Charnes et al. (1981) model is that it is appropriate for dealing with non-
discretionary variables that are qualitative or categorical. Moreover, it can be applied even when there 
is no natural ordering of the environmental variable. This means that the direction of influence does 
not need to be specified. The model is easy to calculate. It is simple and therefore transparent. The 
main disadvantage of the Charnes et al. (1981) model is that it lessens the discriminating power of 
DEA, which depends on the number of entities relative to the number of variables included in the 
model. As the Charnes et al. (1981) model considers various sub-samples, the smaller the sub-sample, 
the lower the discriminating power between entities that is achieved by DEA (all other things being 
equal). 
 
5. Comparing the models: a literature review 
Various studies have conducted benchmark analysis of alternative methods to measure efficiency (such 
as COLS, SFA, DEA or Free Disposal Hull). Evidence suggests that the choice of technique affects 
efficiency scores and rankings of entities. See Johnes (2004, pp. 661-662) for a short review. For 
instance, Farsi and Filippini (2005) assess the electricity distribution utilities in Switzerland. They 
study the sensitivity of three benchmarking methods, one being non-parametric and two being 
parametric: DEA, COLS and SFA. Their results indicate that both efficiency scores and rankings of 
entities are significantly different across methods. Another example is provided by Badillo and Paradi 
(1999, p 76-100), who show that diverging results are observed when only non-parametric methods 
are used, such as DEA and Free Disposal Hull (FDH).  
Alternative models to measure efficiency, within DEA, can also lead to diverging results but this has 
been far less investigated. Whilst few studies address this issue, interest seems to have been growing in 
recent years. 
Some studies (Cordero, Pedraja & Santin, 2009; Estelle, Johnson & Ruggiero, 2010; Harrison, Rouse 
& Armstrong, 2012; Muñiz et al., 2006; Ruggiero, 1996; Ruggiero, 1998; Ruggiero, 2004) use 
                                                 
17  This is a major difference between the program analysis model and other models. The remaining technical 
inefficiency in all other models can be attributed to managerial inefficiency. 
18  The ‘Program Follow Through’ was launched in 1968 for a period of ten years in the United States as a federally 
sponsored program providing health, educational and social services to disadvantaged early primary school pupils 
and their family. 
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simulated data to compare alternative DEA models to the ‘true’ efficiency estimates performed by the 
simulation. However, the objective of these studies is to allow for comparisons between efficiency 
estimates performed by the alternative models and ‘true’ efficiency estimates. The objective of these 
studies is not, therefore, to determine if the efficiency estimates performed by the alternative models 
are convergent or divergent. 
Very few studies (namely Cordero-Ferrara et al., 2008; Muñiz, 2002; Yang and Pollitt, 2009) use 
empirical data in order to specifically benchmark alternative DEA models19. In these studies, 
comparisons are made between the efficiency estimates of the alternative models.  
As practitioners and decision makers tend to perform their own efficiency analysis, the potential issue 
of diverging results is a matter of concern. If the alternative models do produce convergent results, 
practitioners and decision makers may confidently select any model. If they produce divergent results, 
the choice of model becomes a strategic issue.  
Studies using simulated and empirical data are presented hereafter. 
 
Simulated data 
Cordero, Pedraja and Santín (2009) consider the following models: one-stage by Banker and Morey 
(1986b), two-stage by Ray (1991) with a Tobit regression, three-stage by Muñiz (2002) and four-
stage by Fried et al. (1999). Technical efficiency scores of these four methods are compared to a ‘true’ 
efficiency measure20. The four-stage model obtains the best results, although its Spearman rank’s 
correlation with the ‘true’ efficiency is moderate (lower than 0.8). Note that the other models have 
very weak or weak Spearman rank’s when the sample of DMUs is small (50). Estelle et al. (2010) 
show that the methodology used for comparison in Cordero et al. (2009) is flawed. Results are 
therefore called into question. Ultimately, Cordero-Ferrara, Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jiménez 
(2008) conclude that there is no consensus on the best model to use.  
Estelle et al. (2010) consider the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model and three variants of the 
three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model (alternatively using ordinary least squares, fractional logit and 
non-parametric regression in the second stage). Using simulated data, results are compared to the 
‘true’ efficiency estimates. The three-stage model performs better than the one-stage model according 
to three indicators: correlation, rank correlation and mean absolute deviation between ‘true’ and 
estimated efficiency. The three variants of the Ruggiero (1998) model are very close one to one 
another. They have a strong correlation and rank correlation with the ‘true’ efficiency (higher than 
0.8). 
Harrison, Rouse and Armstrong (2012) use simulated data to compare the standard variable returns 
to scale (VRS) model (without non-discretionary variables), the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986a) 
model and the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model with the ‘true’ efficiency estimates 
performed by the simulation. Discussing, first, all alternative models which allow for an 
environmental adjustment, Harrison et al. (2012) note that “there is no DEA model that is clearly 
                                                 
19  Other studies, such as Diagne (2006), McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) or Garrett and Kwak (2011), perform 
alternative DEA models using empirical data. However, the objective of these studies is not to compare the 
models. Moreover, in the three studies cited above, a standard DEA model is performed instead of the Banker 
and Morey (1986b) model, although non-discretionary variables are included. The results are therefore flawed, 
rendering invalid comparisons. 
20  ‘True’ efficiency is determined by a known artificial set of data as the production function, used to simulate data. 
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superior in controlling for non-discretionary inputs (…)” (p. 263). Considering then the objective of 
their study, they conclude that (1) the Banker and Morey models perform equally well and (2) the 
Banker and Morey models should be used in preference to the standard VRS model when the 
influence of the environment is moderate to high.  
Muñiz et al. (2006) use simulated data to compare the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model, 
the three-stage Muñiz (2002) model, the three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model and the one-stage Yang 
and Paradi model (in Muñiz, Ruggiero, Paradi and Yang (2006, p. 1176)) with the ‘true’ efficiency 
estimates performed by the simulation. Three indicators are used to assess the models’ performance: 
the rank correlation between ‘true’ and estimated efficiency, the mean absolute deviation and the 
percentage of entities for which inefficiency is overestimated. The Banker and Morey (1986b) model, 
using the variable returns to scale assumption, provides a rank correlation close to the Muñiz (2002) 
model. It does not perform as well as the other models. The Muñiz (2002) model is the second best 
performer when the number of variables is small, but the results worsen when the number of variables 
increases. The Ruggiero (1998) model is the best performer in all the cases analyzed except one 
scenario. Finally, the Yang and Paradi model tends to overestimate inefficiency. It is also negatively 
affected by an increase in the number of variables.  
Ruggiero (1996) uses simulated data to compare the one-stage Ruggiero (1996) model and the one-
stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model with the ‘true’ efficiency estimates performed by the 
simulation. Based on several indicators (Ruggiero, 1996, p. 561), he shows that the Ruggiero (1996) 
model performs better than the Banker and Morey (1986b) model. This latter model tends to 
underestimate efficiency scores. Ruggiero (1996) applies his model to an empirical case of 556 school 
districts in the State of New York, USA. Unfortunately, he does not run a Banker and Morey (1986b) 
model with the same data in order to compare the results.  
Ruggiero (1998) uses simulated data to compare a standard DEA model (without non-discretionary 
variables), the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986a) model, the one-stage Ruggiero (1996) model, the 
one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model, the two-stage Ray (1991) model (with two variants in 
the second stage regression analysis – linear and log-linear) and the three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model 
(with two variants in the second stage regression – linear and log-linear) with the ‘true’ efficiency 
estimates performed by the simulation. Four indicators are used to assess the models’ performance: 
the correlation and the rank correlation between ‘true’ and estimated efficiency, the mean absolute 
deviation and the percentage of entities for which efficiency is inferior to the ‘true’ efficiency. The 
two- and three-stage models perform better than the one-stage models (including the standard DEA). 
The Ray (1991) model (both linear and log-linear variants) performs better than all other models 
based on the correlation and rank correlation criteria. These main results are confirmed by Ruggiero 
(2004). 
 
Empirical data 
Cordero-Ferrara et al. (2008) discuss various models including Banker and Morey (1986b), Ruggiero 
(1996)21, Ray (1991), Fried et al. (2002) and Fried et al. (1999). They conclude that “an analysis of 
the different options does not allow us to conclude that any one is better than the others, that is, none 
of them is free of constraint” (p. 1329). Cordero-Ferrara et al. (2008) also apply a second-stage 
model, using Tobit regression, and the fourth-stage Fried et al. (1999) model to an empirical case (80 
                                                 
21  This model is wrongly cited as Ruggiero (1998) in Cordero-Ferrara et al. (2008, p. 1326). 
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high-schools in the State of Extramaduria, Spain). They compare the fourth-stage model with a 
standard DEA model containing only discretionary variables. The rank correlation (Spearman) 
between the two models is 0.714. The number of efficient schools and the mean efficiency increase in 
the four-stage model.  
Muñiz (2002) uses empirical data on 62 high-schools in the State of Asturias (Spain). He tests a 
standard DEA model without non-discretionary variables, the Banker and Morey (1986b) model and 
the three-stage Muñiz (2002) model. The most important finding lies in the number of efficient 
schools: 5 in the standard model, 12 in the three-stage model and 30 in the one-stage model. Based 
on the comparison between the one- and the three-stage models, Muñiz (2002) also shows that the 
majority of schools (75%) present less than 10% difference in efficiency scores. Schools facing a 
difference of more than 10% are usually efficient in the one-stage model, but not in the third-stage 
model. These results provide support for the Banker and Morey (1986b) model, as “it can be stated 
that both classifications present similar results except in the case when part of the units are considered 
efficient in the one-stage model” (Muñiz, 2002, p. 637). Unfortunately, no Pearson and Spearman 
correlations are run by Muñiz (2002).  
Yang and Pollitt (2009) use empirical data on 221 Chinese coal-fired power-plants. They test a 
standard DEA model (without non-discretionary variables), the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) 
model, the two-stage Ray (1991) model (with two variants in the second stage regression – Tobit and 
logistic), the three-stage Fried et al. (2002) model and the four-stage Fried et al. (1999) model. The 
Yang and Pollitt (2009) study distinguishes itself from other studies comparing models in the sense 
that they include undesirable outputs. The fact that the number of non-discretionary variables 
included in the alternative models is not the same (two in the one-stage model, seven in the other 
models) must also be noted22. Based on the correlations and the rank correlations between the 
efficiency scores of the alternative models, the following comments can be made: 
- The standard DEA model and the third-stage model have a perfect correlation (0.98) and a 
perfect rank correlation (0.988); 
- The standard DEA model and the fourth-stage model have a strong correlation (0.885) and a 
strong rank correlation (0.889); 
- The three- and four-stage models have, in general, a higher correlation with the other models; on 
this basis, Yang and Pollitt (2009) suggest that “it indicates that these two models are able to 
explain most of the features of the other models, thus suggesting their superiority” (p. 1104). 
- Correlations between the models vary from 0.311 to 0.98; rank correlations vary from 0.441 to 
0.988. This suggests that alternative models lead to diverging results. 
 
To sum up 
The best available evidence, synthetized in Table 2, suggests that: 
- There is no consensus on the best model to use (Cordero-Ferrara et al., 2008); 
- The one-stage Banker and Morey (1986a; 1986b) models perform equally well (Harrison et al., 
2012); 
- The one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) and the three-stage Muñiz (2002) model present 
similar results for a majority of entities under assessment (Muñiz, 2002); 
                                                 
22  As the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model cannot accommodate dummy variables, only two remaining 
non-discretionary variables were included in it. 
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- The one-stage Ruggiero (1996) model performs better than the Banker and Morey (1986b) 
model (Ruggiero, 1996); 
- The three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model perform better than the Banker and Morey (1986b) 
model, the Yang and Paradi model and the Muñiz (2002) model (Muñiz et al., 2006); 
- Based on the correlation and the rank correlation criteria, the two-stage Ray (1991) model 
performs better than the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986b) model, the one-stage Ruggiero 
(1996) model and the three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model (Ruggiero, 1998); this evidence is 
confirmed in Ruggiero (2004);  
- The three-stage Fried et al. (2002) and the four-stage Fried et al. (1999) are only compared to 
other models in Yang and Pollitt (2009). As the models include undesirable outputs and as the 
number of non-discretionary variables varies across the models, the results of this study cannot be 
generalized. 
 
Table 2 
Models’ performance 
Best available evidence Reference
Banker and Morey (1986a) = Banker and Morey (1986b) Harrison et al.  (2012)
Banker and Morey (1986b) = Muñiz (2002) Muñiz (2002)
Ray (1991) > Banker and Morey (1986b) Ruggiero (1998); Ruggiero (2004)
Ray (1991) > Ruggiero (1996) Ruggiero (1998); Ruggiero (2004)
Ray (1991) > Ruggiero (1998) Ruggiero (1998); Ruggiero (2004)
Ruggiero (1996) > Banker and Morey (1986b) Ruggiero (1996)
Ruggiero (1998) > Banker and Morey (1986b) Ruggiero (1998)
Ruggiero (1998) > Yang and Paradi (2006) Ruggiero (1998)
Ruggiero (1998) > Muñiz (2002) Muñiz et al.  (2006)  
 
Although the rule of transitivity does not apply, the best evidence available suggests that the Ray 
(1991) model seems superior to alternative models. 
The following critical comments conclude this literature review: 
- The indicators used to assess the models’ performance in the above mentioned studies (with 
simulated and empirical data) are probably not sufficient. It would have been wise to add 
statistical hypothesis tests in order to refine the analyszes. Yang and Pollitt (2009) are the only 
ones to perform a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. However, this test does not seem appropriate in 
their context, and should probably have been substituted by a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test (see 
Section 8 about it). 
- Some studies (Muñiz et al., 2006; Ruggiero, 1996; Ruggiero, 1998; Yang & Pollitt, 2009) do not 
indicate the level of significance of the correlation coefficients (Pearson and/or Spearman) 
between the results of the alternative models and the ‘true’ efficiency measure. As a result, it is 
difficult to validly take into account their conclusion with respect to these indicators. 
- Studies using simulated data merely indicate which is the model whose results are the closest to 
the ‘true’ efficiency measure. But they do not indicate whether the convergence between the 
alternative models (even the ‘best’ one) and the ‘true’ efficiency measure is acceptable or not. As 
a result, it is difficult to draw a general conclusion stating that the alternative models produce 
convergent or divergent results with the ‘true’ efficiency measure. 
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6. Methodology 
The choice of alternative models later used in this study is made from a practitioner’s standpoint 
according to three criteria: the degree of sophistication of the models, the level of computational skills 
needed to perform the models and the inclusion of models in DEA software23. Three commercial 
(PIM-DEA ®, DEA-Solver PRO ® and DEAFrontier ®) and two free (Win4DEAP and Efficiency 
Measurement System – EMS –) software packages are considered. 
The degree of sophistication is considered as: 
- Low for one-stage models which can be performed in existing software; 
- Moderate for one-stage models which are not included in existing software and which need, as a 
result, coding from the practitioners; 
- Moderate for two-stage models; 
- High for three- and four-stage models. 
The level of computational skills is considered as: 
- Low if the model can be performed using an existing software; 
- Moderate if it requires two different software packages but can easily be performed; 
- High if it requires coding or two different software packages and a good command of these 
packages. 
To be retained, a model has to show a low or moderate degree of sophistication, a low or moderate 
level of computational skills and be included in existing software. Table 3 presents the alternative 
models according to the three criteria. 
                                                 
23  Note that Yang and Pollitt (2009, p. 1098) consider the easiness to understand, to apply and to interpret the 
models as advantages. The simplicity of calculation is considered by Muñiz (2002, p. 632) as another advantage. 
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Table 3 
Ten models are assessed according to their sophistication, the computational skills needed to perform them 
and their inclusion in existing software 
 
 
Five models are retained: one-stage Banker and Morey (1986a) – BM1986a; one-stage Banker and 
Morey (1986b) – BM1986b; one-stage Yang and Paradi – YP2006; two-stage Ray (1991) – R1991; 
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program analysis Charnes et al. (1981) – C1981. With the exception of YP2006, these models 
coincidentally correspond to those recommended by Coelli et al. (2005, pp. 191-194).  
According to the best evidence available, the two-stage model performs better than the one-stage 
Ruggiero (1996) model and the three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model (Ruggiero, 1998, 2004). As the 
three-stage Ruggiero (1998) model performs better than the three-stage Muñiz (2002) model, it 
appears logical to retain the two-stage model.  
Although they have been criticized, the one-stage Banker and Morey (1986a) and Banker and Morey 
(1986b) models are supported by Harrison et al. (2012) who note that these models are widely used 
by researchers. They have generated at least 239 different publications (Löber & Staat, 2010, p. 810). 
Harrison et al. (2010, p. 263) stress that it suggests that many researchers have found these models 
appropriate for their particular context. They also mention that “given there is no DEA model that is 
clearly superior in controlling for non-discretionary inputs, researchers continue to refer to the work 
of Banker and Morey (1986a, b)” (p. 263). 
The three-stage Fried et al. (2002) model and the four-stage Fried et al. (1999) model suffer from a 
lack of comparison with other models. Yang and Pollitt (2009, p. 1097) clearly considered the three-
stage model as the most sophisticated. As the comparison performed by Yang and Pollitt (2009) 
includes undesirable outputs, it is not clear if the conclusion of their study would have remained the 
same had the undesirable outputs been excluded. Further comparative studies featuring theses models 
are therefore needed. 
The Charnes et al. (1981) program analysis model is retained. Unlike the other models, it estimates a 
technical efficiency devoid of managerial efficiency. As a result, it cannot be direcly compared to the 
other models. However, this model is retained to test if its results are, somehow unexpectedly, 
convergent to the estimates of other models. 
Finally, a standard VRS model (without non-discretionary variables) is also retained as a base case –
 VRS. 
The models are compared with one another on the basis of several indicators: mean efficiency, median 
efficiency, minimum efficiency, maximum efficiency, number of efficient schools, Pearson correlation 
and Spearman rank correlation. These are standard indicators commonly used in studies comparing 
models, such Cordero et al. (2009), Estelle et al. (2010), Harrison et al. (2012), Muñiz et al. (2006), 
Ruggiero (1996), Ruggiero (1998), Cordero-Ferrara et al. (2008), Muñiz (2002) and Yang and Pollitt 
(2009). In addition to these indicators, Yang and Pollitt (2009) perform the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test. However, as developed in Section 8, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test does not seem 
appropriate in the case described in Yang and Pollitt (2009). As a result, the Wilcoxon signed rank 
sum test is preferred and retained in this study. 
 
7. Data and models 
Database 
At the State of Geneva level, information about school input and output are atomized into various 
databases belonging to different administrative units. Public access to these databases is denied, 
making information about school production process unknown and opaque. However, cross-sectional 
data concerning the 2010-2011 school year and the 90 public primary schools has been secured for 
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this study24. It includes pupils’ results at standardized tests (aggregated at schools level), the number of 
full-time equivalent staff and various environmental variables. Useful data had to first be gathered 
from the different administrative units and second be organized into a workable order. 
 
Discretionary and non-discretionary variables 
Three discretionary outputs and three discretionary inputs are considered. These variables are all 
under the control of headteachers and are aggregated over schools. 
Discretionary outputs include three composite scores (on a standardized scale with a maximum of 
100) purely reflecting the quality of the education process. The first one is composed of pupils’ results 
in French and mathematics standardized tests at the end of the second grade (SCORE2). The second 
one is composed of pupils’ results in French, German and mathematics standardized tests at the end 
of the fourth grade (SCORE4). Finally, the third one is composed of pupils’ results in French, 
German and mathematics standardized tests at the end of the sixth grade (SCORE6). 
A large part of the studies focus specifically on standardized test scores as outputs25. Among those are 
Bessent and Bessent (1980), Bessent, Bessent, Kennington and Reagan (1982), Bradley et al. (2001), 
Chalos and Cherian (1995), Chalos (1997), Demir and Depren (2010), Kirjavainen and Loikkanen 
(1998), Mizala, Romaguera and Farren (2002), Ray (1991), Ruggiero (1996, 2000) or Sengupta 
(1990). Agasisti et al. (2014, p. 123) note that “such choice represents today the standard for 
analyzing school efficiency”.  
Discretionary inputs include (1) the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) teaching staff 
(TEACHER), (2) the number of FTE administrative and technical staff (ADMIN) and (3) the school 
budget in Swiss francs – excluding staff salaries and capital expenditure (BUDGET)26. The three 
inputs are expressed by pupils to be coherent with the formulation of the outputs. Note that 
BUDGET consists of a (relatively) small financial amount received by schools according to the 
number and the types of classes it runs. It can be used to finance teachers conducting supplementary 
tasks (i.e. tasks which do not appear in their contracts) or to buy school materials, support cultural 
activities, etc. 
In 2010, according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, the first two inputs (TEACHER and 
ADMIN) correspond to 94.9% of the public education operating expenses of the State of Geneva 
(State and local authorities – municipalities)27. They are formulated in FTE as opposed to monetary 
terms given that schools are not responsible for the age pyramid of their teachers and other staff. 
                                                 
24  The 2010-2011 school year is a typical school year. Nothing makes the author think that the results of this study 
would have been different if another school year was used. 
25  The fact to include variables reflecting other aspects of human capability (and not only test scores) is open to 
debate. For instance, David Broddy, chairman of the Society of Heads, made the following statement at the 
Society of Heads’ annual meeting in 2013 (Paton, 2013): “What part have we played in allowing that only 
academic success is a measure of human capability? That a definition of a “good” school is one that rises to the 
top of exam league tables and the definition of a “bright” pupil is one that gets A* grades?” 
Unfortunately, in the State of Geneva, such other aspects are either not defined or, if defined, not measured. 
26  Note that test scores from previous school year could be used as an input when longitudinal data is available. 
27  These statistics are available at : 
 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/15/02/data/blank/01.html. 
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Taking into account the wages of the employees (which automatically grow higher alongside 
seniority) would unfairly alter the efficiency of a school with a greater proportion of senior staff28. 
The inputs are very similar to those used by Arcelus and Coleman (1997) – FTE teachers, FTE 
support staff, operating expenses and library expenses – although BUDGET is a feature in this study. 
The number of teachers and the number of administrative staff are classical inputs (Abbott & 
Doucouliagos, 2003; Avkiran, 2001; Grosskopf & Moutray, 2001) as are the overhead expenses (Ahn 
& Seiford, 1993; Beasley, 1990; Chalos & Cherian, 1995; Engert, 1996). 
In the State of Geneva, schools are grouped into five categories according to a single non-discretionary 
variable: the percentage of pupils (per school) whose parents are blue-collar workers or unqualified 
workers (SOCIO). Note that the positive discrimination policy impacts only TEACHER (see Table 1 
in Section 2) and not ADMIN or BUDGET.  
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 4. For instance, schools in category C have 
0.0566 teachers per pupil, 0.0034 administrative staff per pupil and CHF 18.8496 per pupil. Pupils 
in category C schools obtain 77.9059 points at the end of grade 2, 77.751 at the end of grade 4 and 
76.8070 points at the end of grade 6. The SOCIO variable has an average value of 38.15% in 
category C. 
Note that 34 schools out of 90 (37.8%) are not grouped according to their theoretical category. For 
instance, 34% of pupils at school # 74 are classified as disadvantaged. This school should be in 
category C, but is actually categorized in B. Several assumptions can explain this observation: 
- The State authority has the discretionary power to group schools in other categories despite the 
value of SOCIO. Out of the 34 schools which are not grouped according to their theoretical 
category, 26 are grouped in a more advantaged category than the one in which they should be 
included29. For example, 23% of pupils at school # 79 are classified as disadvantaged, indicating 
that it should be in category B, but is actually categorized in A. 
- Headteachers use their negotiation power in order to move their school to a more disadvantaged 
category than the one in which they should be included. Out of the 34 schools which are not 
grouped according to their theoretical category, 8 are grouped in a more disadvantaged category30. 
The fact that some schools are not grouped in their theoretical category has an impact on the Banker 
and Morey (1986a) model and the Charnes et al. (1981) model, as these two models are based on 
entities’ categories. In this study, two alternatives are therefore considered:  
- In the first one, the Banker and Morey (1986a) model and the Charnes et al. (1981) model are 
based on the observed schools’ categorization (BM1986a-O and C1981-O); 
- In the second one, the Banker and Morey (1986a) model and the Charnes et al. (1981) model are 
based on the theoretical schools’ categorization (BM1986a-T and C1981-T). 
                                                 
28  The question to include wages as an input instead of FTE is open to debate. It would probably be appropriate in 
a context where schools can freely set teachers’ salary. But in a context where teachers’ salary is set by public 
authority and grow automatically alongside seniority, higher wages are not a good proxy of teaching quality. For 
instance, Woessmann (2003) shows that the teachers’ age influences negatively pupil’s performance. 
29  As TEACHER depends on the category, this could reflect the State’s willingness to minimize expenses. But 
considerations other than financial could also explain the fact that some schools are not grouped in their 
theoretical category. For instance, the State authority may have considered that, for other reasons than the 
socioeconomic statu, some particular schools should be moved to another category. 
30  As TEACHER depends on the category, headteachers have an interest to be in a more disadvantaged category in 
order to receive more resources. 
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Table 4 
Statistical summary of output and input variables included in the first stage DEA model 
-Observed category- (sample size = 90 primary schools) 
A B C D E Total 
Number of schools 15 20 20 15 20 90
OUTPUTS
SCORE2 (points/pupil)
Mean 81.1284 80.6277 77.9059 77.9345 76.8063 78.8082
SD 2.3604 4.2687 4.0426 4.6632 5.1538 4.4956
Minimum 76.1504 71.9674 68.9075 69.0868 64.9589 64.9589
Maximum 84.0542 91.9591 83.2465 85.6571 88.8975 91.9591
SCORE4 (points/pupil)
Mean 80.0865 79.1950 77.7510 75.9859 73.7298 77.2733
SD 2.2735 3.6067 2.8951 3.9605 2.9263 3.8718
Minimum 75.8127 68.9830 72.7422 68.0930 68.9577 68.0930
Maximum 83.4049 87.3654 81.5557 81.3806 78.5661 87.3654
SCORE6 (points/pupil)
Mean 80.2470 78.6407 76.8070 76.2867 72.4740 76.7382
SD 2.6391 3.8218 3.6879 4.8185 3.6197 4.5361
Minimum 75.6189 70.2255 66.1693 66.2378 64.7010 64.7010
Maximum 85.1323 84.5935 81.4771 85.5275 78.5470 85.5275
INPUTS
TEACHER (FTE/pupil)
Mean 0.0558 0.0550 0.0566 0.0581 0.0648 0.0582
SD 0.0018 0.0017 0.0013 0.0018 0.0035 0.0043
Minimum 0.0532 0.0520 0.0546 0.0559 0.0572 0.0520
Maximum 0.0599 0.0583 0.0596 0.0618 0.0689 0.0689
ADMIN (FTE/pupil)
Mean 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 0.0037 0.0035
SD 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
Minimum 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.0029 0.0032 0.0026
Maximum 0.0045 0.0052 0.0044 0.0041 0.0050 0.0052
BUDGET (CHF/pupil)
Mean 22.3694 19.8652 18.8496 19.1546 20.8817 20.1643
SD 6.2819 7.5281 4.0493 5.1942 5.4515 5.8233
Minimum 13.8019 13.2040 8.8186 13.3897 13.6034 8.8186
Maximum 32.1989 48.2835 27.6211 31.3439 33.3575 48.2835
NON-DISC. VARIABLE
SOCIO
Mean 19.6000 26.0500 38.1500 46.2000 54.9000 37.4333
SD 3.6801 6.9998 3.7455 3.7455 5.4086 13.7253
Minimum 15.0000 11.0000 29.0000 39.0000 45.0000 11.0000
Maximum 28.0000 37.0000 46.0000 54.0000 64.0000 64.0000
OBSERVED CATEGORY
 
Source: General Direction of Primary Schools, Education Department, State of Geneva. 
 
An unexpected observation emerges from Table 4. The average teacher/pupil ratio is lower in category 
B (0.055) than in category A (0.0558). Theoretically, it should be higher. This is partially explained 
by the fact that: 
- Eight schools grouped in category A should actually belong to category B as they present a value 
of SOCIO higher than 19.99%. This implies that the teacher/pupil ratio of category A is pushed 
upwards. 
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- Three schools grouped in category B should actually belong to category A as they present a value 
of SOCIO lower than 20%. This implies that the teacher/pupil ratio of category B is pushed 
downwards. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables based on their theoretically categories are reported in Table 5. 
The average teacher/pupil ratio in category B (0.0554) is still lower than in category A (0.0557). This 
means that even when the categories are theoretically (re)composed, other unknown factors influence 
the allocated quantity of teaching staff31. 
                                                 
31  This could simply be due to the fact that the number of teachers cannot be easily adjusted – up- or down – from 
one school year to the next. For instance, assume that the ratio of teachers to pupils has to be reduced in a 
school. As the number of pupils is non-discretionary, the State authority has to reduce the number of teachers in 
this school. However, teachers benefit from the guarantee of employment. Except under exceptional 
circumstances, they cannot be fired. Neither can they be forced to move to another school. Consequently, if 
teachers refuse to relocate to another school, the ratio of teachers to pupils cannot be reduced and would thus 
remain ‘artificially high’. This could be the case in category A schools. 
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Table 5 
Statistical summary of output and input variables included in the first stage DEA model 
-Theoretical category- (sample size = 90 primary schools) 
A B C D E Total 
Number of schools 10 18 20 23 19 90
OUTPUTS
SCORE2 (points/pupil)
Mean 81.3409 79.8970 79.9912 77.9780 76.2036 78.8082
SD 2.5378 2.9255 4.2877 4.6426 5.3413 4.4956
Minimum 75.7948 74.4785 71.9674 68.9075 64.9589 64.9589
Maximum 84.0542 85.0372 91.9591 85.6571 88.8975 91.9591
SCORE4 (points/pupil)
Mean 81.5598 79.8333 77.8690 76.0102 73.4941 77.2733
SD 3.2380 1.6527 2.7511 3.2162 3.3763 3.8718
Minimum 76.0190 75.8127 68.9830 69.5880 68.0930 68.0930
Maximum 87.3654 81.8875 80.8669 81.3806 80.2393 87.3654
SCORE6 (points/pupil)
Mean 81.1046 78.6428 78.0296 76.5137 71.5482 76.7382
SD 2.8699 3.7172 2.4987 4.2160 3.4189 4.5361
Minimum 75.6189 70.2255 73.5402 66.1693 64.7010 64.7010
Maximum 85.1323 82.5055 84.5935 85.5275 78.3456 85.5275
INPUTS
TEACHER (FTE/pupil)
Mean 0.0557 0.0554 0.0563 0.0579 0.0646 0.0582
SD 0.0011 0.0020 0.0023 0.0023 0.0039 0.0043
Minimum 0.0543 0.0520 0.0526 0.0551 0.0562 0.0520
Maximum 0.0583 0.0599 0.0616 0.0661 0.0689 0.0689
ADMIN (FTE/pupil)
Mean 0.0035 0.0036 0.0032 0.0035 0.0036 0.0035
SD 0.0003 0.0008 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
Minimum 0.0031 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 0.0032 0.0026
Maximum 0.0040 0.0052 0.0041 0.0044 0.0050 0.0052
BUDGET (CHF/pupil)
Mean 22.6474 20.9626 18.0419 19.7753 20.8063 20.1643
SD 6.6455 8.1456 3.6295 4.7841 5.5989 5.8233
Minimum 13.8019 13.7500 8.8186 13.3897 13.6034 8.8186
Maximum 32.1989 48.2835 23.1899 31.3439 33.3575 48.2835
NON-DISC. VARIABLE
SOCIO
Mean 16.1000 23.3889 35.0500 44.4348 56.0000 37.4333
SD 2.3310 3.1086 2.8741 2.8095 4.2817 13.7253
Minimum 11.0000 20.0000 30.0000 40.0000 50.0000 11.0000
Maximum 19.0000 29.0000 39.0000 49.0000 64.0000 64.0000
THEORETICAL CATEGORY
 
Source: General Direction of Primary Schools, Education Department, State of Geneva, and own calculation. 
 
Table 6 compares the teacher/pupil target ratio (second column) with the teacher/pupil observed ratio 
(fourth column) in the two alternatives considered: observed (upper part of the table) versus 
theoretical (lower part of the table) categorization. The third column of the table recalls the 
percentage of targeted additional teaching staff that each category should have when compared with 
category A. For instance, schools in category D should have 11.41% more teaching staff than schools 
in category A. As these values are target values, they are the same in both alternatives. Finally, the fifth 
column displays the percentage of real additional teaching staff that each category gets when 
compared with category A. For instance, schools in category C have 1.49% more teaching staff than 
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schools in category A when the categorization is observed, but only 1.08% when the categorization is 
theoretically-based. 
 
Table 6 
Teacher/pupil ratio in the observed and in the theoretical categorization 
Observed category
(# of schools)
Teacher/pupil
target ratio
Additional teaching staff
per pupil (%) (target)
Teacher/pupil
effective ratio
Additional teaching staff
per pupil (%) (effective)
A (15) 0.0539 0.00 0.0558 0.00
B (20) 0.0551 2.20 0.0550 -1.34
C (20) 0.0573 6.30 0.0566 1.49
D (15) 0.0601 11.41 0.0581 4.18
E (20) 0.0656 21.64 0.0648 16.15
Theoritical category
(# of schools)
Teacher/pupil
target ratio
Additional teaching staff
per pupil (%) (target)
Teacher/pupil
effective ratio
Additional teaching staff
per pupil (%) (effective)
A (10) 0.0539 0.00 0.0557 0.00
B (18) 0.0551 2.20 0.0554 -0.54
C (20) 0.0573 6.30 0.0563 1.08
D (23) 0.0601 11.41 0.0579 4.01
E (19) 0.0656 21.64 0.0646 15.99  
Source: General Direction of Primary Schools, Education Department, State of Geneva, and own calculation. 
 
Except for schools in category B, the observed value of additional teaching staff is higher than the 
theoretically-based categorization. As a result, the values of the observed categorization are closer to 
the targeted additional teaching staff values than the theoretical categorization. This could also explain 
why the observed categorization of schools differs from the theoretical one (i.e. it has been adjusted 
from the theoretical categorization in order to better reduce the gap towards the targeted values)32.  
The correlation matrix of the input and output variables is presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Correlation Matrix for the variables 
TEACHER 1.00
ADMIN 0.29 ** 1.00
BUDGET 0.08 -0.10 1.00
SCORE2 -0.22 * -0.09 0.07 1.00
SCORE4 -0.46 ** -0.01 -0.07 0.33 ** 1.00
SCORE6 -0.49 ** -0.09 0.05 0.30 ** 0.49 ** 1.00
SOCIO 0.75 ** 0.07 -0.04 -0.36 ** -0.67 ** -0.61 ** 1.00
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level
SCORE4 SCORE6 SOCIOTEACHER ADMIN BUDGET SCORE2
 
 
Statistically significant correlations are discussed hereafter. On the input side, the correlation between 
TEACHER and ADMIN is positive but very weak33. On the output side, correlations are positive but 
                                                 
32  To sum up, the separation between categories is not as complete as might be desired. In addition to the human 
resources factor, other possible contaminating effects could emerge from pupils’ mobility from one school to 
another during the school year. 
33  Correlation coefficients are considered as perfect between 1 and 0.98 (or -1 and-0.98), strong between 0.97 and 
0.8 (or -0.97 and -0.8), moderate between 0.79 and 0.6 (or -0.79 and -0.6), weak between 0.59 and 0.35 (or -0.59 
and -0.35) and very weak between 0.34 and 0 (or -0.34 and 0). 
  
28 
very weak between SCORE2 and SCORE 4 (0.33) and between SCORE2 and SCORE6 (0.3) and 
weak between SCORE4 and SCORE6 (0.49).  
Correlations between TEACHER and the discretionary output variables are negative and very weak 
(TEACHER and SCORE2) or weak (TEACHER and SCORE4, TEACHER and SCORE6). This 
finding is coherent with Hanushek (2006). Based on a meta-analysis, he shows that school resources 
are weakly associated with school performance. The fact that the value of the correlation is increasing 
(or worsening) betweenTEACHER and SCORE2 (–0.22), SCORE4 (–0.46) and SCORE6 (–0.49) is 
intriguing. A possible interpretation of this result is that the number of teachers matters more in the 
early grades than in the later grades.  
The correlation between the non-discretionary variable SOCIO and TEACHER is positive but only 
moderate (0.75). This reflects the fact that, despite the positive discrimination policy, the State of 
Geneva retains discretionary power in the allocation of resources, or that the rigidity in terms of 
human resource management does not always allow the State authority to increase or reduce the 
teacher/pupil ratio as desired. Unsurprisingly, correlations between SOCIO and SCORE2, 4 and 6 is 
negative. 
 
Models 
All DEA models are run using a variable returns to scale (VRS) assumption and an input orientation. 
The free software package Win4DEAP is used to perform all models except the Banker and Morey 
(1986b) model34. For this model, the free package EMS is used35. The software STATA ® is used to 
perform the second stage of the two-stage model. 
The standard VRS model is performed without SOCIO. The Banker and Morey (1986a) model, the 
Charnes et al. (1981) model and the Yang and Paradi model are performed according to (1) the five 
observed school categories and (2) the five theoretical school categories. SOCIO is included as a 
continuous non-discretionary variable in the Banker and Morey (1986b) model. In order to allow a 
coherent comparison, SOCIO is also the only environmental variable considered in the two-stage Ray 
(1991) model36. Finally, note that no bootrstapping procedure is applied37. 
                                                 
34  As DEAP is a DOS program, a user friendly Windows interface has been developed for it (Win4DEAP). These 
‘twin’ software packages have to be both downloaded and extracted to the same folder. Win4DEAP cannot work 
without DEAP. 
 DEAP Version 2.1: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/deap.htm 
 Win4DEAP Version 1.1.3: http://www8.umoncton.ca/umcm-deslierres_michel/dea/install.html 
35  The Banker and Morey (1986b) model is not included in Win4DEAP, but is included in EMS or commercial 
software packages such as PIM-DEA or DEA-Solver PRO. 
 EMS: http://www.holger-scheel.de/ems/ 
36  Other environmental variables than SOCIO could have been added in the BM1986a, BM1986b and R1991 
models. The decision to include only SOCIO is justified by the fact that the State of Geneva uses SOCIO as the 
only variable in order to model its positive discrimination policy. The results of the models are therefore 
influenced by a single environmental variable. They could have been different if additional environmental 
variables had been considered. 
37  Applying a bootstrapping procedure could make sense in the case of the Banker and Morey (1986a) and the 
Charnes et al. (1981) models, as the E category contains a limited number of schools. This option has not been 
retained because it introduces a supplementary difficulty and sophistication for practitioners and decision 
makers. Bootstrapping procedures are not included in the basic version of existing software packages, and 
therefore need coding skills from the practitioners.  
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Two alternative variants of the Yang and Paradi model are performed. The first variant applies the 
values of jh  and jhˆ  displayed in Table 8 to all inputs and outputs (YP2006-I&O). For instance, 
schools’ inputs in category C are multiplied by a factor of 0.9407; offsetting the additional the 6.3% 
of resources received by schools C according to the teacher/pupil target ratio (see Table 6); outputs in 
category C are multiplied by a factor of 1.063; allowing for the 6.3% augmenting of outputs. The 
second variant applies the values of jh  to all inputs but does not adjust the outputs (YP2006-I)38. 
 
Table 8 
Inputs are multiplied by the jh  factor and outputs by the jhˆ  factor 
Category
A 1 1
B 0.9784 1.0220
C 0.9407 1.0630
D 0.8976 1.1141
E 0.8221 1.2164
jh jhˆ
 
 
As the positive discrimination policy of the State of Geneva concerns only the number of teaching 
staff, the handicapping measure in the Yang and Paradi model could be modified in order to be 
exclusively oriented towards it. This modified model corresponds to an extension of YP2006 and is 
customized for cases of positive discrimination concerning specific variables in the model. As the 
original YP2006 model adjusts all discretionary inputs and outputs, the modified model restricts the 
adjustment exclusively to the variables impacted by the positive discrimination policy (one in the 
Geneva case). Other discretionary inputs and outputs are not adjusted. As a result, inputs are divided 
into two categories: inputs impacted by the positive discrimination policy ( WithPDujx ) and inputs not 
impacted by the positive discrimination policy ( NoPDijx ). Assume jh  is the handicapping measure to 
adjust input variables impacted by the positive discrimination policy. The adjusted inputs are 
WithPD
ujj xh . There are data on s  outputs, m  inputs not impacted by the positive discrimination policy 
and v  inputs impacted by the positive discrimination policy for each of n  primary schools to be 
evaluated. rky  is the quantity of output r  produced by school k . 
WithPD
ujx is the quantity of input u  
consumed by school k . NoPDijx  is the quantity of input i  consumed by school k . jλ  represents the 
associated weighting of outputs and inputs of entity j . kθ  represents the VRS efficiency of school k  
(i.e. ‘pure’ technical efficiency free from any scale inefficiency). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38  The Yang and Paradi model formulation specifies that the handicapping measure is applied to all inputs and/or 
outputs. In this study, the handicap measure is applied (1) to all inputs and outputs and (2) to all inputs only, as 
the positive discrimination policy in the State of Geneva is oriented towards inputs.  
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This modified model, named Huguenin (H2014), is specified as follows: 
 
Minimize kθ  (4) 
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The handicapping measure jh  takes the values displayed in Table 8 (second column). These values 
allow TEACHER to be adjusted for the additional staff allocated under the positive discrimination 
policy. For instance, schools in category D obtain 11.41% additional teaching staff. The 
handicapping measure of 0.8976 applied for schools in category D allows for the actual number of 
teaching staff that these schools would have obtained if the positive discrimination policy had not 
been implemented39. As BM1986a, C1981 and YP2006, the Huguenin model is performed according 
to (1) the five observed school categories and (2) the five theoretical school categories. 
 
Two-stage model 
As only one environmental variable is used as an explanatory variable in the second stage of the Ray 
(1981) model, no risk of multicollinearity arises. The OLS model takes the following form40: 
TEk = α0 + α1SOCIO + ek 
TEk is the gross efficiency score, derived from the first stage analysis, of the kth school and ek is an 
error term satisfying the usual conditions for ordinary least squares estimation.  
                                                 
39  It could be criticised that (1) the handicapping measure is only applied to inputs impacted by the positive 
discrimination policy and (2) the choice of using the target additional teaching staff values as handicapping 
measures are questionable. However, these decisions are justified by the fact that the State of Geneva estimates 
that its positive discrimination policy only impacts one discretionary input (TEACHER) and that the targeted 
values adequately reflect the environmental influence. It is not the aim of this study to assess the relevancy of 
these political decisions. 
40  Recent studies have shown that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is sufficient or even more appropriate 
to model the efficiency scores (Hoff, 2007; McDonald, 2009). OLS is, therefore, the method of choice in the 
ensuing study. 
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The potential presence of heteroskedasticity in the second stage is considered. A Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is performed. It tests the null hypothesis (Ho) that 
the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative 
function of one or more variables. If Ho is accepted, it indicates homoskedasticity; if it is rejected, it 
indicates heteroskedasticity. 
The χ2 of the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is equal to 7.83 with a p-value of 0.0051. As the 
p-value is smaller than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected indicating that there is significant evidence 
of heteroskedasticity. Following this result, the model is corrected for heteroskedasticity by running 
an OLS regression with robust standard errors.  
In the second-stage regression, it could be argued that the proportion of disadvantaged pupils 
increases where pupil performance is poor, and therefore SOCIO is endogenous to school efficiency. 
Pupil performance (measured by standardized tests) is used as an output in the first stage. All other 
things being equal, poor performance reduces efficiency. Priviledged parents will move to other 
neighbourhoods in order to remove their children from low performing schools. As the State of 
Geneva is facing a housing crisis, with limited housing available and high rental rates, only privileged 
parents could afford to move into these areas. This move consequently increases the proportion of 
remaining disadvantaged pupils. As a result, a risk of simultaneity could occur between SOCIO and 
SCORE2, 4 and 6.  
Endogeneity is solved by using instrumental variables. Instruments are identified following the 
procedure used by Waldo (2007): first, the instruments have to correlate with the potential 
endogenous variables; second, they must not have any explanatory power on efficiency scores if they 
are to be used as independent variables alongside the potential endogenous variables. 
27 variables are tested in order to identify instruments. These variables are all measured at the 
municipality level in which schools are located41. The potentially endogenous SOCIO variable 
presents a correlation coefficient above |0.5| with only one variable: social assistance rate (BENEFIT), 
with a positive correlation of 0.6.  
To measure the explanatory power of BENEFIT, an additional model is run. It includes BENEFIT 
alongside SOCIO. BENEFIT has a coefficient value of  minus 0.0002792 (t value of – 0.08) and is 
not statistically significant. As a result, BENEFIT can be considered as an instrumental variable. 
The model tests SOCIO as a potentially endogenous variable, using BENEFIT as an instrument. A 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is performed. The null hypothesis (Ho) states that endogeneity is not 
present in the model. If Ho is accepted, it indicates the absence of endogeneity; if it is rejected, it 
indicates that endogeneity exists within the model. The χ2 of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is equal 
                                                 
41  The 27 variables are as follows: population (2011), population density per km2,(2011), proportions of the 
population (2011) between (1) 0 and 19 years old, (2) 20 and 64 years old, (3) over 64 years old, area in km2 
(1992/1997, latest data available), habitat and infrastructure area (%), agricultural area (%), wooded area (%), 
unproductive area (%), total number of jobs (2008, latest data available), number of jobs in the primary sector, 
number of jobs in the secondary sector, number of jobs in the tertiary sector, total number of companies (2008, 
latest data available), number of companies in the primary sector, number of companies in the secondary sector, 
number of companies in the tertiary sector, number of newly built apartments (2010), social assistance rate 
(2011), share of votes in the last federal election for left parties (2011), tax burden for married people with two 
children and an annual revenue of 100’000 CHF (State, municipal and religious tax, in % of gross labour income) 
(2011), budget surplus (excess revenue) (2011), gross debt (2011), taxable wealth of natural persons (2008, latest 
data available), taxable income of natural persons (2008, latest data available), taxable profit of corporations 
(2009, latest data available). 
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to 0.00638 with a p-value of 0.93635. As the p-value is larger than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
accepted. No endogeneity is found.  
This is not surprising. In this study, SOCIO is assumed to be the cause of SCORE2, 4 and 6. If 
information about pupil performance (measured by standardized tests) was public knowledge, it could 
potentially encourage parents to move into catchment areas of better schools. However, in a principal-
agent approach of educational production (Wössmann, 2005), asymmetric information about school 
data between the principal (i.e. the parents) and the agent (i.e. the headteacher) appears to be strong 
in the State of Geneva. Information about school quality (pupil performance) and resource 
consumption are computed at the State level and is unknown by parents. Therefore, parents cannot 
base their move on rational data and it is unlikely that SOCIO is endogenous. 
The procedure of Gasparini and Ramos (2003), applied in De Witte and Moesen (2010) or in 
Agasisti, Bonomi and Sibiano (2014), is used to derive adjusted net efficiency scores for each school: 
)emax1(e k
,...,1k ni
Net
k
=
−+=θ  
where Netkθ  is the adjusted net efficiency score of of the kth school and ke  is the residual for each 
school obtained from the OLS estimation. 
 
8. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 9 displays the descriptive statistics of: 
- The standard VRS model; 
- The five models which allow for an environmental adjustment (BM1986a; BM1986b; R1991; 
YP2006; H2014); 
- The C1981 model; noting that this model shows efficiency scores devoid of managerial 
inefficiency but does not adjust for the environment. 
The upper part of Table 9 displays results for the observed categories; the lower part displays results 
for the theoretical categories. 
For instance, the YP2006-I&O model has, considering the theoretical categories, a mean efficiency 
score of 0.9345 with a standard deviation of 0.056. The median efficiency score is 0.9452. This 
means that half the schools have a score higher than 0.9452 and half the schools have a score lower 
than 0.9452. In this model, the minimum efficiency score obtained by a school is 0.7976 and the 
maximum score is 1. 19 schools (row ‘Number of efficient schools’) are fully efficient. 
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Table 9 
Descriptive statistics of the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment and the two models 
without environmental adjustment (VRS and C1981) 
VRS BM1986a BM1986b R1991 I&O I H2014 C1981
Observed category
Mean 0.9321 0.9787 0.9793 0.9009 0.9340 0.9654 0.9650 0.9517
SD 0.0671 0.0342 0.0339 0.0450 0.0516 0.0392 0.0401 0.0537
Min. 0.7604 0.8572 0.8415 0.7939 0.7981 0.8556 0.8544 0.7976
Max. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Median 0.9481 1.0000 1.0000 0.9041 0.9344 0.9763 0.9779 0.9657
Number of efficient schools 20.0000 51.0000 46.0000 1.0000 17.0000 31.0000 31.0000 25.0000
Theoretical category
Mean 0.9321 0.9751 0.9793 0.9009 0.9345 0.9604 0.9587 0.9553
SD 0.0671 0.0394 0.0339 0.0450 0.0560 0.0455 0.0463 0.0537
Min. 0.7604 0.8482 0.8415 0.7939 0.7976 0.8344 0.8338 0.7813
Max. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Median 0.9481 1.0000 1.0000 0.9041 0.9452 0.9769 0.9747 0.9774
Number of efficient schools 20.0000 50.0000 46.0000 1.0000 19.0000 29.0000 29.0000 28.0000
YP2006
I&O
 
 
Based on Table 9, the following facts are established: 
- No obvious difference emerges from the descriptive statistics between results of the observed and 
the theoretical categories. 
- BM1986a and BM1986b have a lower discriminating power than the other models; more than 
half of the schools are efficient in these models. They have the highest mean efficiency scores 
amongst all models. 
- VRS and YP2006-I&O have close mean efficiency scores.  
- YP-I and H2014 have close mean efficiency scores and a similar number of efficients schools. 
- H2014 and C1981 have close mean efficiency scores. 
 
Comparison between the observed and the theoretical categorizations 
Table 10 displays the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the same models in the 
observed and the theoretical categorizations. For instance, the Pearson correlation between the 
efficiency scores of YP2006-I&O in the observed categorization and the efficiency scores of YP2006-
I&O in the theoretical categorization is equal to 0.8022. 
 
Table 10 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the same models in the observed and the 
theoretical categorizations 
BM1986a BM1986b R1991 YP2006
I&O
YP2006
I
H2014 VRS C1981
Pearson 0.7696** 1.0000** 1.0000** 0.8022** 0.8343** 0.8736** 1.0000** 0.8834**
Spearman 0.6872** 1.0000** 1.0000** 0.7810** 0.8192** 0.8606** 1.0000** 0.8955**
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level  
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As the efficiency scores of BM1986b, R1991 and VRS do not differ in the two categorizations, the 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are perfect. The efficiency scores of the other models are impacted 
by the type of categorization. YP2006-I, H2014 and C1981 present strong correlations in both 
Pearson and Spearman. YP2006-I&O has a strong Pearson correlation and a moderate Spearman 
correlation. BM1986a have moderate correlations in both Pearson and Spearman. 
The difference between the two categorizations is further tested in order to determine whether 
differences occur by chance or are statistically significant. 
Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007) show that “since the theoretical distribution of the efficiency score 
in DEA is usually unknown, we are forced to deal with nonparametric statistics for which the 
distribution of the DEA scores are statistically independent” (p. 233). They use a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test in order to identify whether the differences between two different groups (for instance 
entities located in an urban environment versus entities located in a rural environment) are 
significant42. 
Yang and Pollitt (2009, p 1103) use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test in order to identify whether 
the difference between the efficiency scores of different models containing the same entities is 
significant. As the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test seems appropriate in the case described in Cooper et 
al. (2007), it does not seem appropriate in the case described in Yang and Pollitt (2009). For this 
latter case, the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test seems better suited and is therefore appropriate to test 
repeated measurements on a single sample (or two related samples or matched samples) in order to 
assess whether their population mean ranks differ43. It therefore seems appropriate to compare 
efficiency scores of different models containing the same entities. A Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is 
thus performed between each model in the two categorizations For instance, the efficiency scores of 
BM1986a in the observed categorization are tested against the efficiency scores of BM1986a in the 
theoretical categorization.  
Table 11 displays results of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test for the three models which allow for 
an environmental adjustment and are impacted by the type of categorization (BM1986a, YP2006 and 
H2014) and for C1981 which is also impacted by the type of categorization but does not allow for an 
environmental adjustment44. The null hypothesis states that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the efficiency scores of the same model in the two categorization alternatives. The 
null hypothesis is accepted for BM1986a, YP2006-I&O and C1981 but is rejected for YP2006-I and 
H2014 at the 1% level45. For YP2006-I and H2014, there is a statistically significant difference 
between the efficiency scores in the observed categorization and the efficiency scores in the 
theoretical categorization46. 
                                                 
42  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-parametric version of the independent samples t-test. 
43  The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is the non-parametric version of the paired samples t-test. 
44  The BM1986b and the R1991 models allow for an environmental adjustement but are not impacted by the type 
of categorization. 
45  A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test has also been performed. The null hypothesis is accepted for all models. 
46 Note that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is another non-parametric hypothesis test used in DEA (Banker, Zheng 
and Natarajan, 2010). As it compares the distribution of two independent samples (and not repeated 
measurements on a single sample), it does not seem appropriate in the context of this study. The null hypothesis 
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test states that there is no statistically significant difference between the distribution 
functions of the same model in the two categorizazions alternatives. For the record, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
has been performed between each model in the two categorizations. The null hypothesis is accepted for all 
models. 
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Table 11 
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test 
BM1986a I&O I H2014 C1981
z-statistic 0.8370 0.4520 2.8200 3.5140 -1.5710
p-value 0.4024 0.6515 0.0048 0.0004 0.1161
YP2006
 
 
Based on Table 10 and Table 11, the following facts are established: 
- All correlations between the same models in the two types of categorization are positive and 
strong, with the exception of BM1986a (Pearson and Spearman correlations) and YP2006-I&O 
(Spearman correlations), which are also positive but only moderate. 
- The null hypothesis of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test cannot be accepted for all models 
which allow for an environmental adjustment. As a result, the distinction between the two types 
of categorization will be kept in the upcoming analysis. 
 
Pearson correlation 
Table 12 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of models in the observed 
categorization alternative. 
Focusing on the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment (the cells in the first six 
rows and columns shaded in light grey), the correlation coefficients are positive and vary from 0.3301 
(BM1986b and YP2006-I&O) to 0.9499 (YP2006-I and H2014). Every single correlation is 
significant at the 1% level. Three correlations are higher than 0.8 and can be described as strong 
(BM1986a and H2014; BM1986a and YP2006-I; YP2006-I and H2014). Seven correlations are 
moderate (0.6787 between BM1986a and R1991; 0.7007 between BM1986b and R1991; 0.6572 
between BM1986b and YP2006-I; 0.6434 between BM1986b and H2014; 0.7454 between R1991 
and YP2006-I; 0.7837 between R1991 and H2014; 0.6002 between YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I). 
Finally, five correlations are weak (0.5811 between BM1986a and BM1986b; 0.5762 between 
BM1986a and YP2006-I&O; 0.3301 between BM1986b and YP2006-I&O; 0.5158 between R1991 
and YP2006-I&O; 0.4931 between YP2006-I&O and H2014). 
 
Table 12 
Pearson correlation coefficients (observed categorization) 
I&O I
BM1986a 1.0000
BM1986b 0.5811** 1.0000
R1991 0.6787** 0.7007** 1.0000
YP2006-I&O 0.5762** 0.3301** 0.5158** 1.0000
YP2006-I 0.9201** 0.6572** 0.7454** 0.6002** 1.0000
H2014 0.8983** 0.6434** 0.7837** 0.4931** 0.9499** 1.0000
VRS 0.6144** 0.4864** 0.6682** -0.0003 0.6162** 0.7529** 1.0000
C1981 0.1679 0.2627* 0.4388** -0.3321** 0.2214* 0.4036** 0.8778** 1.0000
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level
H2014 VRS C1981BM1986a BM1986b R1991
YP2006
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The Pearson correlation coefficients between the standard VRS model and the five models which 
allow for an environmental adjustment are positive and weak (BM1986b), positive and moderate 
(BM1986a; R1991; YP2006-I; H2014) or negative and very weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that this 
latter correlation is not statistically significant. VRS and C1981 have a strong positive correlation. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the C1981 model and the five models which allow for 
an environmental adjustment are positive and very weak (BM1986a; BM1986b; YP2006-I), positive 
and weak (R1991; H2014) or negative and very weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that the correlation 
between C1981 and BM1986a is not statistically significant. 
Table 13 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of models in the theoretical 
categorization alternative. 
Focusing on the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment (the cells in the first six 
rows and columns shaded in light grey), the correlation coefficients are positive and vary from 0.5050 
(YP2006 and H2014) to 0.9652 (YP2006-I and H2014). Every single correlation is significant at the 
1% level. Six correlations are higher than 0.8 and can be described as strong (BM1986a and 
BM1986b; BM1986a and YP2006-I; BM1986a and H2014; R1991 and YP2006-I; R1991 and 
H2014; YP2006-I and H2014). Seven correlations are moderate (0.7218 between BM1986a and 
R1991; 0.6238 between BM1986a and YP2006-IO&O; 0.7007 between BM1986b and R1991; 
0.7641 between BM1986b and YP2006-I; 0.7343 between BM1986b and H2014; 0.6329 between 
R1991 and YP2006-I&O; 0.6108 between YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I). Finally, two correlations 
are weak (0.5414 between BM1986b and YP2006-I&O; 0.5050 between YP2006-I&O and H2014). 
 
Table 13 
Pearson correlation coefficients (theoretical categorization) 
I&O I
BM1986a
BM1986b 0.8145** 1.0000
R1991 0.7218** 0.7007** 1.0000
YP2006-I&O 0.6238** 0.5414** 0.6329** 1.0000
YP2006-I 0.9071** 0.7641** 0.8394** 0.6108** 1.0000
H2014 0.8693** 0.7343** 0.8306** 0.5050** 0.9652** 1.0000
VRS 0.5958** 0.4864** 0.6682** 0.0490 0.6935** 0.7914** 1.0000
C1981 0.0421 0.0392 0.3328** -0.3584** 0.2303* 0.3765** 0.8238** 1.0000
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level
H2014 VRS C1981BM1986a BM1986b R1991
YP2006
 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the standard VRS model and the five models which 
allow for an environmental adjustment are positive and moderate (R1991; YP2006-I; H2014), 
positive and weak (BM1986a; BM1986b) or positive and very weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that this 
latter correlation is not statistically significant. VRS and C1981 have a strong positive correlation. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the C1981 model and the five models which allow for 
environmental adjustment are positive and very weak (BM1986a; BM1986b; R1991; YP2006-I), 
positive and weak (H2014) or negative and weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that the correlations between 
C1981 and BM1986a or BM1986b are not statistically significant. 
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Based on Table 12 and Table 13, the following facts are established: 
- The Pearson correlation between C1981 and the five models which allow for an environmental 
adjustment is either weak or very weak. This is not a surprise, as C1981 does not adjust for the 
environment.  
- In some cases, the Pearson correlation between VRS and models which allow for an 
environmental adjustment is moderate and statistically significant. This was not expected, as VRS 
does not adjust for the environment. 
- The Pearson correlations among the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment are 
positive. However, they are mainly moderate.  
- Overall, nine correlations are strong (30%), fourteen are moderate (47%) and seven are weak 
(23%). The nine strong correlations link the following models: BM1986a and H2014, BM1986a 
and YP2006-I, YP2006-I and H2014 in the observed categorization; BM1986a and BM1986b, 
BM1986a and YP2006-I, BM1986a and H2014, R1991 and YP2006-I, R1991 and H2014, 
YP2006-I and H2014 in the theoretical categorization. Note that BM1986a appears five times in 
these nine strong correlations. 
- The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis is the first indication that the results of a majority of 
models which allow for an environmental adjustment are divergent. To be considered as 
convergent, a strong or a perfect correlation would be needed. 
 
Spearman correlation 
Table 14 displays the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between each pair of models in the 
observed categorization alternative. 
Focusing on the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment (the cells in the first six 
rows and columns shaded in light grey), the correlation coefficients are positive and vary from 0.3710 
(BM1986b and YP2006-I&O) to 0.9072 (YP2006-I and H2014). Every single correlation is 
significant at the 1% level. Three correlations are higher than 0.8 and can be described as strong 
(BM1986a and YP2006-I; BM1986a and H2014; YP2006-I and H2014)47. Seven correlations are 
moderate (0.6022 between BM1986a and R1991; 0.6081 between BM1986a and YP2006-I&O; 
0.6010 between BM1986b and R1991; 0.6482 between BM1986b and YP2006-I; 0.6163 between 
BM1986b and H2014; 0.6638 between R1991 and YP2006-I; 0.7008 between R1991 and H2014). 
Finally, five correlations are weak (0.5964 between BM1986a and BM1986b; 0.3710 between 
BM1986b and YP2006-I&O; 0.5178 between R1991 and YP2006-I&O; 0.5848 between YP2006-
I&O and YP2006-I; 0.4704 between YP2006-I&O and H2014). 
 
                                                 
47  These three pairs of models are also associated with a strong Pearson correlation. 
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Table 14 
Spearman correlation coefficients (observed categorization) 
I&O I
BM1986a 1.0000
BM1986b 0.5964** 1.0000
R1991 0.6022** 0.6010** 1.0000
YP2006-I&O 0.6081** 0.3710** 0.5178** 1.0000
YP2006-I 0.8508** 0.6482** 0.6638** 0.5848** 1.0000
H2014 0.8092** 0.6163** 0.7008** 0.4704** 0.9072** 1.0000
VRS 0.5033** 0.4363** 0.5580** -0.0183 0.5467 0.7192** 1.0000
C1981 0.1498 0.1925 0.3377** -0.2587* 0.2587* 0.4493** 0.8756** 1.0000
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level
VRS C1981
YP2006
BM1986a BM1986b R1991 H2014
 
 
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the standard VRS model and the five models 
which allow for an environmental adjustment are positive and weak (BM1986a; BM1986b; R1991; 
YP2006-I), positive and moderate (H2014) or negative and very weak (YP2006-I&O). VRS and 
C1981 have a strong positive correlation. Note that the correlations between VRS and YP2006-I&O 
or YP2006-I are not statistically significant. 
The Spearman correlation coefficients between the C1981 model and the five models which allow for 
an environmental adjustment are positive and very weak (BM1986a; BM1986b; R1991; YP2006-I), 
positive and weak (H2014) or negative and very weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that the correlations 
between C1981 and BM1986a or BM1986b are not statistically significant. 
Table 15 displays the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between each pair of models in the 
theoretical categorization alternative. 
Focusing on the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment (the cells in the first six 
rows and columns shaded in light grey), the correlation coefficients are positive and vary from 0.4594 
(YP2006 and H2014) to 0.9179 (YP2006-I and H2014). Every single correlation is significant at the 
1% level. Two correlations are higher than 0.8 and can be described as strong (BM1986a and 
YP2006-I; YP2006-I and H2014). Eleven correlations are moderate (0.7207 between BM1986a and 
BM1986b; 0.6576 between BM1986a and R1991; 0.6649 between BM1986a and YP2006-I&O; 
0.7986 between BM1986a and H2014; 0.6010 between BM1986b and R1991; 0.6804 between 
BM1986b and H2014; 0.6353 between R1991 and YP2006-I&O; 0.7752 between R1991 and 
YP2006-I; 0.7643 between R1991 and H2014; 0.6035 between YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I). 
Finally, two correlations are weak (0.5257 between BM1986b and YP2006-I&O; 0.4594 between 
YP2006-I&O and H2014)48. 
 
                                                 
48  These two pairs of models are also associated with a weak Pearson correlation. 
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Table 15 
Spearman correlation coefficients (theoretical categorization) 
I&O I
BM1986a 1.0000
BM1986b 0.7207** 1.0000
R1991 0.6576** 0.6010** 1.0000
YP2006-I&O 0.6649** 0.5257** 0.6353** 1.0000
YP2006-I 0.8449** 0.7000** 0.7752** 0.6035** 1.0000
H2014 0.7986** 0.6804** 0.7643** 0.4594** 0.9179** 1.0000
VRS 0.5169** 0.4363** 0.5580** 0.0244 0.6326** 0.7872** 1.0000
C1981 0.0817 0.0970 0.2842** -0.2640* 0.2843** 0.4586** 0.8250** 1.0000
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level
H2014 VRS C1981BM1986a BM1986b R1991
YP2006
 
 
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the standard VRS model and the five models 
which allow for an environmental adjustment are positive and moderate (YP2006-I; H2014), positive 
and weak (BM1986a; BM1986b, R1991) or positive and very weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that this 
latter correlation is not statistically significant. VRS and C1981 have a strong positive correlation. 
The Spearman correlation coefficients between the C1981 model and the five models which allow for 
an environmental adjustment are positive and very weak (BM1986a; BM1986b; R1991; YP2006-I; 
H2014) or negative and very weak (YP2006-I&O). Note that the correlations between C1981 and 
BM1986a or BM1986b are not statistically significant. 
Based on Table 14 and Table 15, the following facts are established: 
- The Spearman correlation between C1981 and each of the five models which allow for an 
environmental adjustment is either weak or very weak. This is not a surprise, as C1981 does not 
adjust for the environment. 
- The Spearman correlation between VRS and models which allow for an environmental 
adjustment is either weak or very weak. It is moderate in only two cases (YP2006-I; H2014). 
- The Spearman correlations among the five models which allow for an environmental adjustment 
are positive. However, they are mainly moderate.  
- Overall, eighteen correlations are moderate (60%), seven are weak (23%) and five are strong 
(17%). The five strong correlations link the following models: BM1986a and YP2006-I, 
BM1986a and H2014, YP2006-I and H2014 in the observed categorization; BM1986a and 
YP2006-I, YP2006-I and H2014 in the theoretical categorization. Note that BM1986a appears 
three times in these five strong correlations. 
- After the Pearson correlation analysis, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient analysis is the 
second indication that the results of the majority of models which allow for an environmental 
adjustment are divergent. To be considered convergent, a strong or a perfect correlation would be 
needed. 
 
Comparison between the models in the observed categorization 
The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is used to assess the difference between each pair of models in the 
observed categorization alternative. For example, the test is performed between the efficiency scores of 
BM1986a and the efficiency scores of R1991. Results are displayed in Table 16. The first number 
appearing in a given cell is the z-statistic and the second number is the p-value. For instance, the 
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Wilcoxon signed rank sum test between BM1986b and H2014 has a z-statistic of 5.124 and a p-value 
of 0. 
 
Table 16 
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test between each pair of models in the observed categorization 
BM1986a BM1986b R1991 I&O I H2014 VRS C1981
BM1986a -0.1330
0.8944
-8.2370
0.0000
-7.8620
0.0000
-7.3980
0.000
-7.3980
0.0000
-7.2450
0.0000
-4.2670
0.0000
BM1986b 0.1330
0.8944
-8.2370
0.0000
-6.7670
0.0000
-5.3430
0.0000
-5.1240
0.0000
-7.4470
0.0000
-4.4870
0.0000
R1991 8.2370
0.0000
8.2370
0.0000
6.1420
0.0000
8.2370
0.0000
8.2370
0.0000
4.8730
0.0000
6.8490
0.0000
YP2006
I&O
7.8620
0.0000
6.7670
0.0000
-6.1420
0.0000
6.1400
0.0000
5.5100
0.0000
0.2800
0.7797
2.2530
0.0242
YP2006
I
7.3980
0.0000
5.3430
0.0000
-8.2370
0.0000
-6.1400
0.0000
1.6220
0.1047
-4.5950
0.0000
-1.5930
0.1111
H2014 7.3980
0.0000
5.1240
0.0000
-8.2370
0.0000
-5.5100
0.0000
-1.6220
0.1047
-5.5420
0.0000
-2.3880
0.0169
VRS 7.2450
0.0000
7.4470
0.0000
-4.8730
0.0000
-0.2800
0.7797
4.5950
0.0000
5.5420
0.0000
5.6140
0.0000
C1981 4.2670
0.0000
4.4870
0.0000
-6.8490
0.0000
-2.2530
0.0242
1.5930
0.1111
2.3880
0.0169
-5.6140
0.0000
YP2006
 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for all but four pairs of models (BM1986a and 
BM1986b; YP2006-I&O and VRS; YP2006-I and H2014; YP2006-I and C1981)49. These four pairs 
of models appear in light grey cells. For the following pairs of models, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the efficiency scores in the first model mentioned and the efficiency scores in the 
second model mentioned: BM1986a and R1991, BM1986a and YP2006-I&O, BM1986a and 
YP2006-I, BM1986a and H2014, BM1986a and VRS, BM1986a and C1981, BM1986b and 
R1991, BM1986b and YP2006-I&O, BM1986b and YP2006-I, BM1986b and H2014, BM1986b 
and VRS, BM1986b and C1981, R1991 and YP2006-I&O, R1991 and YP2006-I, R1991 and 
H2014, R1991 and VRS, R1991 and C1981, YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I, YP2006-I&O and 
H2014, YP2006-I&O and C1981, YP2006-I and VRS, H2014 and VRS, H2014 and C1981, VRS 
and C1981. 
Among the four pairs for which the null hypothesis is accepted, only two pairs concern models which 
exclusively allow for an environmental adjustment (BM1986a and BM1986b; YP2006-I and H2014). 
Based on Table 16, the following facts are established: 
- Two of the pairs of models which allow for an environmental adjustment do not have a 
statistically significant difference between their efficiency scores (BM1986a and BM1986b; 
YP2006-I and H2014). The other pairs of models which allow for an environmental adjustment 
have a statistically significant difference between their efficiency scores (BM1986a and R1991; 
BM1986a and YP2006-I&O; BM1986a and YP2006-I; BM1986a and H2014; BM1986b and 
R1991; BM1986b and YP2006-I&O; BM1986b and YP2006-I; BM1986b and H2014; R1991 
and YP2006-I&O; R1991 and YP2006-I; R1991 and H2014; YP2006-I&O and H2014). 
                                                 
49  Two additional tests have also been performed (a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and a Kolgomorov-Smirnov 
test). The results are similar to the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test, except that the null hypothesis is accepted by 
two additional pairs of models (H2014 and C1981; VRS and C1981). 
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- The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test performed on every pair of models in the observed 
categorization is the third indication that the results for the majority of models which allow for an 
environmental adjustment are divergent. 
 
Comparison between the models in the theoretical categorization 
The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is used to assess the difference between each pair of models in the 
theoretical categorization alternative. For example, the test is performed between the efficiency scores 
of BM1986b and the efficiency scores of R1991. Results are displayed in Table 17. The first number 
appearing in a given cell is the z-statistic and the second number is the p-value. For instance, the 
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test between R1991 and YP2006-I&O has a z-statistic of –6.307 and a p-
value of 0. 
 
Table 17 
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test between every pair of models in the theoretical categorization 
BM1986a BM1986b R1991 I&O I H2014 VRS C1981
BM1986a 0.4070
0.6838
-8.2370
0.0000
-7.8260
0.0000
-7.4940
0.0000
-7.3630
0.0000
-7.1290
0.0000
-2.7510
0.0059
BM1986b -0.4070
0.6838
-8.2370
0.0000
-7.1400
0.0000
-6.4570
0.0000
-6.4010
0.0000
-7.3130
0.0000
-3.3610
0.0008
R1991 8.2370
0.0000
8.2370
0.0000
6.307
0.000
8.2370
0.0000
8.2370
0.0000
4.885
0.000
6.7220
0.0000
YP2006
I&O
7.8260
0.0000
7.1400
0.0000
-6.307
0.000
5.4660
0.0000
4.5340
0.0000
0.0720
0.9423
2.3000
0.0215
YP2006
I
7.4940
0.0000
6.4570
0.0000
-8.2370
0.0000
-5.4660
0.0000
-0.5250
0.5996
-4.2400
0.0000
-0.6920
0.4888
H2014 7.3630
0.0000
6.4010
0.0000
-8.2370
0.0000
-4.5340
0.0000
0.5250
0.5996
-4.9300
0.0000
-0.8720
0.3831
VRS 7.1290
0.0000
7.3130
0.0000
-4.885
0.000
-0.0720
0.9423
4.2400
0.0000
4.9300
0.0000
5.0910
0.0000
C1981 2.7510
0.0059
3.3610
0.0008
-6.7220
0.0000
-2.3000
0.0215
0.6920
0.4888
0.8720
0.3831
-5.0910
0.0000
YP2006
 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for all but five pairs of models (BM1986a and 
BM1986b; YP2006-I&O and VRS; YP2006-I and H2014; YP2006-I and C1981; H2014 and 
C1981)50. These five pairs of models appear in light grey cells. Compared to the observed 
categorization, the null hypothesis is accepted for an additional pair (H2014 and C1981). For the 
following pairs of models, there is a statistically significant difference between the efficiency scores in 
the first model mentioned and the efficiency scores in the second model mentioned: BM1986a and 
R1991, BM1986a and YP2006-I&O, BM1986a and YP2006-I, BM1986a and H2014, BM1986a 
and VRS, BM1986a and C1981, BM1986b and R1991, BM1986b and YP2006-I&O, BM1986b 
and YP2006-I, BM1986b and H2014, BM1986b and VRS, BM1986b and C1981, R1991 and 
YP2006-I&O, R1991 and YP2006-I, R1991 and H2014, R1991 and VRS, R1991 and C1981, 
                                                 
50  Two additional tests have also been performed (a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and a Kolgomorov-Smirnov 
test). The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are similar to the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum 
test. The results of the Kolgomorov-Smirnov test are similar to the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test, 
except that the null hypothesis is accepted by two additional pairs of models (H2014 and VRS; VRS and C1981). 
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YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I, YP2006-I&O and H2014, YP2006-I&O and C1981, YP2006-I and 
VRS, H2014 and VRS, VRS and C1981. 
Among the five pairs for which the null hypothesis is accepted, only two pairs concern models which 
exclusively allow for an environmental adjustment (BM1986a and BM1986b; YP2006-I and H2014). 
These pairs are the same identified by the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test in the observed 
categorization. 
Based on Table 17, the following facts are established: 
- Two of the pairs of models which allow for an environmental adjustment do not have a 
statistically significant difference between their efficiency scores (BM1986a and BM1986b; 
YP2006-I and H2014). 
- The other pairs of models which allow for an environmental adjustment have a statistically 
significant difference between their efficiency scores (BM1986a and R1991; BM1986a and 
YP2006-I&O; BM1986a and YP2006-I&O; BM1986a and H2014; BM1986b and R1991; 
BM1986b and YP2006-I&O; BM1986b and YP2006-I; BM1986b and H2014; R1991 and 
YP2006-I&O; R1991 and YP2006-I; R1991 and H2014; YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I; YP2006-
I&O and H2014). 
- The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test performed on each pair of models in the theoretical 
categorization is the fourth indication that the results for the majority of models which allow for 
an environmental adjustment are divergent. 
 
To sum up 
Table 18 sums up the Pearson, Spearman and Wilcoxon signed rank sum analysis. Among the five 
models which allow for an environmental adjustment (BM1986a, BM1986b, R1991, YP2006 and 
H2014): 
- The results of BM1986a seem to diverge with R1991, YP2006 and H2014 based on the 
Wilcoxon test. Consequently, the choice of the model (made by politicians or decision makers) 
impacts school management in terms of schools’ input targets and rankings. According to the 
model selected, the technical efficiency score and the ranking of a particular school are divergent. 
The results of BM1986a and BM1986b seem to converge based on the Wilcoxon test. This 
finding is in line with Harrison et al. (2012) who conclude that both models perform equally 
well with small or medium sample sizes. However, the Pearson and the Spearman correlations are 
weak in the observed categorization. From a managerial perspective, the choice of the model is 
therefore not meaningless in terms of schools’ efficiency scores and rankings. 
Figure 1 shows the efficiency scores (in the observed categorization) of BM1986a and BM1986b 
for each school51. Eight schools out of 90 have an efficiency score which differs by more than 5% 
between the two models. These schools are assigned by their respective numbers on the figure. 
For instance, school # 11 has an efficiency score of 1 and is equally ranked # 1 ex aequo with the 
other efficient schools in the BM1986a model52; however, it has an efficiency score of 0.8415 and 
is ranked # 90 in the BM1986b model. For such a school, the choice of the model implies 
serious managerial consequences. In the BM1986a model, school # 11 is considered efficient and 
                                                 
51  In order to facilitate comparison, schools are arranged in the figure according to the efficiency scores obtained by 
the BM1986a model. Note that the Y-axis is truncated at the value of 0.7. 
52  According to the Spearman method of calculating the ranks, school # 11 is ranked # 26 (compared to all the 
other efficient schools). 
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is top-ranked. In the BM1986b model, school # 11 should reduce its inputs by 15.85% in order 
to become efficient and is ranked last.  
Among these eight schools, seven are in category E and one in category D (school # 21). 
Schools # 5, 11 and 12 have a SOCIO value of under 50%. The other five schools have a 
SOCIO value higher than 60%. Two interpretations can be made. First, it seems that the 
difference of efficiency scores between BM1986a and BM1986b grows alongside the value of 
SOCIO. Second, it seems that, among the eight schools, BM1986b tends to allocate a smaller 
efficiency score, compared to BM1986a, to schools with a relatively small value of SOCIO, and a 
higher efficiency score to schools with a relatively high value of SOCIO. This is not surprising, as 
BM1986a does not discriminate among schools in the same category, as opposed to BM1986b, 
which actually takes into consideration the individual value of SOCIO for each school. 
Note that when the eight schools mentioned above are taken out of the sample, the Pearson and 
the Spearman correlations of the 82 remaining schools have a value of 0.9261 and of 0.8191 
respectively. Both correlations are considered as strong and are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Figure 1 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and BM1986b for each school 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- The results of BM1986b seem to diverge with R1991, YP2006-I&O, YP2006-I and H2014 
based on the Wilcoxon test.  
- The results of R1991 seem to diverge with BM1986a, BM1986b, YP2006-I&O, YP2006-I and 
H2014 based on based on the Wilcoxon test.  
- The results of YP2006-I&O seem to diverge with BM1986a, BM1986b, R1991, YP2006-I and 
H2014 based on the Wilcoxon test. The fact that YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I diverge is 
problematic. It shows that, within the same model, the choice of adjusting inputs and/or outputs 
lead to different results. 
- The results of YP2006-I seem to diverge with BM1986a, BM1986b, R1991 and YP2006-I&O 
based on the Wilcoxon test. However, they seem to converge with H2014 (see Figure 253). The 
                                                 
53  In order to facilitate comparison, schools are arranged in the figure according to the efficiency scores obtained by 
the YP2006-I model. Note that the Y-axis is truncated at the value of 0.7. 
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converging results between YP2006-I and H2014 are easily understandable, as these two models 
are very similar. Recall that when H2014 adjusts only the input impacted by the positive 
discrimination policy (TEACHER), YP2006-I adjusts all inputs, impacted or not by the above 
mentioned policy (TEACHER, ADMIN and BUDGET). 
 
Figure 2 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and H2014 for each school 
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- The results of H2014 seem to diverge with BM1986a, BM1986b, R1991 and YP2006-I&O 
based on the Wilcoxon test. However, they seem to converge with YP2006-I. 
In cases of divergence, the choice of the model (made by politicians or decision makers) impacts 
school management in terms of schools’ input targets and rankings. According to the model selected, 
the technical efficiency score and the ranking of a particular school are divergent. 
When the models allowing for an environmental adjustment are compared with the VRS and the 
C1981 models, the following conclusions are made: 
- The results of VRS seem to diverge with BM1986a, BM1986b, R1991, YP2006-I and H2014 
based on the Wilcoxon test.  
The VRS results seem to converge with YP2006-I&O based on the Wilcoxon test. As YP2006-
I&O adjusts the efficiency scores for the environmental influence and VRS does not, the fact that 
these two models provide convergent efficiency scores is a counterintuitive result. However, 
Muñiz et al. (2006) show that the YP2006 model tends to overestimate inefficiency (in other 
words, to underestimate efficiency) when compared to the ‘true’ efficiency. As a matter of fact, 
the mean efficiency of the VRS and the YP2006 models is 0.9321 and 0.934 respectively. Among 
all of the models which allow for an environmental adjustment (except for the R1991 model), the 
YP2006-I&O model produces the lowest mean efficiency. This could explain why its results are 
convergent with the VRS results. 
- The results of C1981 seem to diverge with BM1986a, BM1986b, R1991 and YP2006-I&O 
based on the Wilcoxon test. However, they converge with YP2006-I. 
The picture between C1981 and H2014 is not clear. Based on the Wilcoxon test, the results of 
these two models seem to diverge when the observed categorization is considered; but the results 
seem to converge when the theoretical categorization is considered. In both cases, the Pearson and 
Spearman correlations are weak. The convergence in the case of the theoretical categorization is 
surprising, as H2014 adjusts for the environment and C1981 adjusts for managerial inefficiency. 
In H2014, efficiency scores are devoid of environmental effects and reveal managerial inefficiency. 
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In C1981, efficiency scores are devoid of managerial inefficiency and reveal the impact of the 
environment. 
- The results of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test in the observed and in the theoretical 
categorizations are convergent for the pairs of models composed exclusively by those allowing for 
an environmental adjustment.  
Interested readers will find a graphical representation of every pair of models in Appendix 2. 
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Table 18 
A diagnostic per model 
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Table 18 
A diagnostic per model (continued) 
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Table 18 
A diagnostic per model (continued) 
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9. Further analysis 
This study could be prolonged by several means which are discussed hereafter. 
- When dealing with empirical data, the quality of data is a serious concern, especially when a 
particular variable is used to group entities into different categories. Even when the quality of data 
seems appropriate, the discretionary power of decision makers could potentially bias the 
categories. Using different or additional variables to group entities into categories could also 
potentially modify the results. In the current study, two alternative categorizations have been 
considered (and tested). 37.8% of schools have been moved from the first categorization 
(observed) to the second categorization (theoretical). It has been concluded that the results of the 
models which allow for an environmental adjustment are unaffected by the categorization. 
Further studies should confirm this conclusion. 
- Additional models (three- and four-stage models) could be performed and compared with the 
models included in the current study. However, as models are compared in pairs, the results of 
the pairs of models performed in this study would remain the same. It must be noted that this 
study has positioned itself from the standpoint of practitioners and decision makers. As a result, it 
has voluntarily omitted some models. 
- The Pearson and the Spearman correlations might be influenced by the fact that many schools 
have efficiency scores equal to one. Table 9 displays the number of efficient schools by model. 
The BM1986a model identifies the highest number of efficient schools: 51 out of 90 (56.67%) in 
the observed categorization. The R1991 model identifies the lowest number of efficient schools: 1 
out of 90 (1.11%). Table 12 and Table 14 display the Pearson and the Spearman correlations 
across models in the observed categorization. The variations in correlation coefficients between 
the models do not seem to be influenced by the number of efficient schools. For instance, the 
Pearson correlations between BM1986a (51 efficient schools) and the other models are as follows: 
0.5811 (BM1986b, 46 efficient schools); 0.6787 (R1991, one efficient school); 0.5762 (YP2006, 
17 efficient schools); 0.9201 (YP2006-I, 31 efficient schools); 0.8983 (H2014, 31 efficient 
schools); 0.6144 (VRS, 20 efficient schools); 0.1679 (C1981, 25 efficient schools)54. 
- In relation to variables, Smith and Mayston (1987) argue the following: 
The choice and relative importance of outputs is ultimately a political judgement, and no 
amount of mathematical analysis can reconcile the diversity of views concerning priorities 
in the public sector. The user of DEA has to recognise this limitation, and at the very least 
it would seem sensible to test the implications of a variety of output sets (p.188). 
- The main findings of the current study indicate that results diverge according to the model 
performed (with the exception of the BM1986a and BM1986b models and of the YP2006-I and 
H2014 models). Ultimately, there is no consensus on the best model to use (Cordero-Ferrara et 
al., 2008). Echoing Smith and Mayston (1987), the choice of model is ultimately a political 
judgement. Practitioners and decision makers have to select the model which is right for them, in 
other words, the model which best suits their own criteria (not to say the model which best serves 
their own interests). In this sense, the application of an appropriate multi-criteria decision analysis 
method to help decision makers select the right model should be investigated in further studies. 
                                                 
54  In this example, the Pearson correlation between the number of efficient schools and the associated Pearson 
coefficients is equal to 0.3365. 
  
50 
10. Conclusion 
This study tests how several alternative models, within DEA, potentially lead to divergent results. Five 
models which allow for an environmental adjustment are retained based on their degree of 
sophistication, their inclusion in existing software and the level of computational skills that they 
require. These models are the following: Banker and Morey (1986a), Banker and Morey (1986b), Ray 
(1991), Yang and Paradi in Muñiz et al. (2006, p. 1176) and a new model developed in this study 
called Huguenin (2013). Unlike studies using simulated data to compare efficiency scores from 
several models, this study uses empirical data concerning 90 primary schools in the State of Geneva, 
Switzerland. With the exception of Ruggiero (1998), no existing study tests so many models. 
The results of the five models are compared on the basis of (1) a Pearson and a Spearman correlation 
analysis and (2) a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test analysis. Except for BM1986a and BM1986b and 
for YP2006-I and H2014, whose results seem to converge, each and every other pair of models (for 
instance R1991 and BM1986b) provide diverging results. In other words, the efficiency scores 
generated by the models forming each pair are significantly different. This finding is valid for the 
specific empirical dataset used in the current study. For this reason, it cannot be generalised to other 
datasets. However, the fact that the efficiency scores diverge in the current study may suggest that the 
results obtained from several alternative models may diverge in other cases too.  
Applied DEA studies traditionally end with recommendations and policy implications. See for 
instance McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993, pp. 285-286), Kantabutra and Tang (2006, pp. 370-372) 
or Jeon and Shields (2008, p. 611). Most of these studies base their recommendations on the 
efficiency results produced by a particular DEA model. This appears to be problematic. As shown in 
this study, several alternative models to measure efficiency, within DEA, deliver diverging results. 
Consequently, recommendations and policy implications may differ according to the model used. 
From a political standpoint, these diverging results could potentially lead to opposite decisions. From 
an applied research standpoint, they should represent a serious matter of concern. And from a 
decision making standpoint, they may lead to opposing managerial choices. 
As no consensus emerges on the best model to use, practitioners and decision makers may be tempted 
to select the model which is right for them, in other words, the model which best suits their own 
criteria and preferences (not to say the model which best serves their own interests). The choice of 
model thus becomes a strategic issue. Further studies should identify and validate such criteria. Once 
these criteria are known, the application of an appropriate multi-criteria decision analysis method to 
help decision makers select the right model should also be investigated. 
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12. Appendix 1 
Banker and Morey (1986a) – One-stage model 
The VRS formulation of the categorical model is specified as follows: 
 
Minimize kθ  (5) 
Subject to ∑
=
≤−
n
j
rjjrk yy
1
0λ  sr ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
≥−
n
j
D
ijj
D
ikk xx
1
0λθ    mi ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
≤
n
j
Cr
rk
Cr
rjj dd
1
)()(λ    Rr ,...,1=  
  1,...,1 −= CrC  
 ∑
=
=
n
j
j
1
1λ  
 0≥jλ   nj ,,1 K=∀  
 
The third set of constraints corresponds to an index of dummy variables Crrkd representing categories 
of the environment. C represents the category level (e.g. school category C) and r represents the 
category variable (where there is more than one category variable). In the case of the State of Geneva, 
there is only one category variable (SOCIO). For example, if there are five category levels (A to E), 
this can be coded using four dummy variables where: 
- d(1) equals zero for schools in category E and one for schools in category D, C, B and A; 
- d(2) equals zero for schools in category E and D and one for schools in category C, B and A; 
- d(3) equals zero for schools in category E, D and C and one for schools in category B and A; 
d(4) equals zero for schools in category E, D, C and B and one for schools in category A. 
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Banker and Morey (1986b) – One-stage model 
The VRS formulation of the Banker and Morey (1986b) model is specified as follows: 
 
Minimize kθ  (6) 
Subject to ∑
=
≤−
n
j
rjjrk yy
1
0λ     sr ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
≥−
n
j
D
ijj
D
ikk xx
1
0λθ    mi ,,1 K=  
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j
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ujj
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uk xx
1
0λ    vu ,...,1=  
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=
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j
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1λ  
 0≥jλ   nj ,,1 K=∀  
 
In the above model, an additional constraint is included for each non-discretionary input ( NDx ). 
These constraints are similar to the constraints for the discretionary inputs ( Dx ) with the exception 
that the efficiency component is not included. As a result, the efficiency is defined with respect to the 
discretionary inputs only. 
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Yang and Paradi model in Muñiz, Ruggiero, Paradi and Yang (2006, p. 1176) – One-
stage model 
Assume jh  is the handicapping measure to adjust input variables and jhˆ  the handicapping measure 
to adjust output variables. The adjusted input is ijj xh  and the adjusted output is rjj yhˆ .The model is 
specified as follows: 
 
Minimize kθ  (7) 
Subject to ∑
=
≤−
n
j
rjjjrkk yhyh
1
0ˆˆ λ     sr ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
≥−
n
j
ijjjikkk xhxh
1
0λθ    mi ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
=
n
j
j
1
1λ  
 0≥jλ   nj ,,1 K=∀  
 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981) – Program analysis model 
Charnes et al. (1981) use a constant returns to scale model to assess efficiency. This model is defined 
as follows: 
 
Minimize kθ  (8) 
Subject to ∑
=
≤−
n
j
rjjrk yy
1
0λ     sr ,,1 K=  
 ∑
=
≥−
n
j
ijjikk xx
1
0λθ    mi ,,1 K=  
 0≥jλ   nj ,,1 K=∀  
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13. Appendix 2 
This appendix presents two graphical representations for each pair of models in the observed 
categorization. Both graphs are built with the same data. Note that the Y-axis of all graphs is 
truncated at the value of 0.7. 
The first graph arranges schools in the figure according to the five school categories (category E to 
category A from left to right). Among a category (for instance school category E), schools are listed by 
alphabetical order. This graphical representation allows identifying visually where the divergence is 
mostly concentrated. For instance, Figure 3 displays the efficiency scores of BM1986a and BM1986b. 
The gap between the two curves is more important on the left of the graph, meaning that the 
divergence occurs mostly in the disadvantaged schools. 
The second graph arranges schools in the figure according to the efficiency scores obtained by one of 
the two models contained in the graph. For instance, Figure 4 arranges schools in the figure according 
to the efficiency scores obtained by the BM1986a model. 
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Figure 3 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and BM1986b for each school – first graph 
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Figure 4 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and BM1986b for each school – second graph 
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Figure 5 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and R1991 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 6 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and R1991 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 7 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and YP2006-I&O for each school – first graph 
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Figure 8 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and YP2006-I&O for each school – second graph 
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Figure 9 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and YP2006-I for each school – first graph 
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Figure 10 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and YP2006-I for each school – second graph 
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Schools
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
BM1986a YP2006-I
 
 
  
65 
Figure 11 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and H2014 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 12 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and H2014 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 13 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and VRS for each school – first graph 
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Figure 14 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and VRS for each school – second graph 
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Figure 15 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 16 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986a and C1981 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 17 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and R1991 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 18 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and R1991 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 19 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and YP2006-I&O for each school – first graph 
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Figure 20 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and YP2006-I&O for each school – second graph 
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Figure 21 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and YP2006-I for each school – first graph 
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Figure 22 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and YP2006-I for each school – second graph 
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Figure 23 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and H2014 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 24 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and H2014 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 25 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and VRS for each school – first graph 
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Figure 26 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and VRS for each school – second graph 
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Figure 27 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 28 
Efficiency scores provided by BM1986b and C1981 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 29 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and YP2006-I&O for each school – first graph 
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Figure 30 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and YP2006-I&O for each school – second graph 
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Figure 31 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and YP2006-I for each school – first graph 
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Figure 32 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and YP2006-I for each school – second graph 
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Figure 33 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and H2014 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 34 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and H2014 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 35 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and VRS for each school – first graph 
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Figure 36 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and VRS for each school – second graph 
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Figure 37 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 38 
Efficiency scores provided by R1991 and C1981 for each school – second graph 
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Schools
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
R1991 C1981
 
 
  
79 
Figure 39 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I for each school – first graph 
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Figure 40 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and YP2006-I for each school – second graph 
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Figure 41 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and H2014 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 42 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and H2014 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 43 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and VRS for each school – first graph 
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Figure 44 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and VRS for each school – second graph 
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Figure 45 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 46 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I&O and C1981 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 47 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and H2014 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 48 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and H2014 for each school – second graph 
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Figure 49 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and VRS for each school – first graph 
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Figure 50 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and VRS for each school – second graph 
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Figure 51 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 52 
Efficiency scores provided by YP2006-I and C1981 for each school – second graph 
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Schools
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
YP2006-I C1981
 
 
  
86 
Figure 53 
Efficiency scores provided by H2014 and VRS for each school – first graph 
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Figure 54 
Efficiency scores provided by H2014 and VRS for each school – second graph 
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Figure 55 
Efficiency scores provided by H2014 and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 56 
Efficiency scores provided by H2014 and C1981 for each school – second graph 
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Schools
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
H2014 C1981
 
 
  
88 
Figure 57 
Efficiency scores provided by VRS and C1981 for each school – first graph 
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Figure 58 
Efficiency scores provided by VRS and C1981 for each school – second graph 
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